A Case Study for an Anti-Monolithic Understanding of Multipolarity
Luca Rampersad | Originally Published: 4 April 2026
Some followers of international relations opine about the multipolar world. Mounting evidence across any number of economic, social, or political issues is kind to those who see plainly that our international order, once famously ordained to mark the “end of history,” has fragmentized and decentralized.
Sometimes, however, these observers fall into a different trap entirely: the assumption that these new poles must remain static across time and (policy) space to be relevant to our understanding of international relations. It is easy to think in terms of diametrics: the West versus the Rest, the G7 versus the BRICS. And indeed, as mentioned, some things really are black and white. But it betrays a comprehensive, nuanced understanding of international affairs to treat BRICS countries as a monolith. To torture the famous simile about the strict party discipline regime in Canadian politics, BRICS countries are far from trained seals. But that does not make the BRICS irrelevant.
One need not look further than the war in Iran for proof. Since Trump and Netanyahu’s airstrikes and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran has lobbied BRICS for a united front against what it perceives as American and Israeli imperialism. No such coalition has assembled, despite Iran being a BRICS member as of 2024. Russia and China offered condemnations, but no meaningful support for Iran’s counter-measures. Meanwhile, India has remained noticeably absent from the discussion. South Africa retains a relatively neutral stance.
Why have these countries left Iran in the lurch? They may all have their own reasons, driven by entrenched economic and cultural interests. Russia and China are having it both ways; supporting Iran’s capacity through selling them dual-use materials and, reportedly, providing satellite imagery access, but failing to provide explicit military support. India’s neutral stance comes alongside a persisting thaw in diplomatic and economic relations with Iran, as it hedges on the international stage and maintains its relationship with Israel, in no small part due to the overlaps between BJP-style and Likud-style ethno-nationalism. In South Africa, capital is a direct player, with business leaders openly urging Pretoria to stay neutral and call loudly for peace.
Much has been made about the BRICS’ apparent betrayal of one of their own. Analysis from the Lowy Institute argues that the BRICS’ inability to build a consensus on the war in Iran demonstrates their wider failure to present a sweeping alternative to the Western global order. Such analysis strikes at the heart of the multipolarity assumption in international politics. It also demonstrates the shortfalls of an assumption that multipolarity necessitates diametric monoliths; the assumption that rigid, “trained seal” party discipline is a necessary component for each “pole” in the international power schematic.
For instance, it unduly minimizes the real agreements between BRICS countries and their real collective opposition to Western influence, in select areas. The BRICS was established in 2008 with the explicit purpose of promoting alternative political and economic systems, targeting the unipolar Western liberal democratic assumption underlying them. At every BRICS summit, the leaders produce a large declaration capturing the many areas in which they agree; from international development, to green tourism, to common credentialing for professions, and much more. The G7 does the same. At the 2024 Kazan Summit, the BRICS members called for reform of major international institutions, like the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN Security Council, while condemning US-backed Israel’s activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Meanwhile, at their 2025 Kananaskis Summit, the G7 discussed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, and condemned China’s “destabilizing activities” in the East and South China Seas.
How do we square this circle? One benefits from understanding, for instance, that the BRICS was never intended, neither at its conception nor now, to represent a security pact or a “new world order,” as the Lowy Institute suggests. The original BRIC Summit, in Yekaterinburg in 2008, said nothing of a common pact to replace the Western global order with a new system of their design. It is, instead, couched in the language of taking account of the needs and interests of all countries; of multilateralism; of strengthening international fora, like the United Nations, to tackle issues at the international level. Even where there is movement on alternative infrastructure, like the New Development Bank or the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, it is an “and,” rather than an “or,” proposition. In the 2025 BRICS Summit Leaders’ Declaration, the BRICS members emphasized the need for a well-resourced International Monetary Fund at the centre, not the periphery, of the global financial safety net (albeit, with necessary reforms).
Of course, it is difficult to defend the idea that Western countries enjoy unity within their ranks at this moment. Approaches to Israel’s genocide of the Palestinian people, and to the recognition of Palestine as a state, expose stark contrasts between G7 countries and their allies. Canada, the United Kingdom, and France now recognize Palestine. Germany does not. Italy and Japan do not recognize Palestine, but have each made statements supportive of Palestinian recognition in the future. The United States is unequivocally opposed to recognizing Palestine as a state. Six of these seven countries are also party to the North Atlantic Treaty, ostensibly a representation of common Western international security interests. It is hard for NATO to express its collective power, for instance, in supporting security efforts in the Levant when a bloc of its membership does not recognize a legitimate governing entity for 5.7 million people within it. One need not invoke Trump’s attacks towards NATO, his apparent interest in supplanting the UN Security Council with a “Board of Peace,” his tariffs against supposed ally states, Canada’s increasing willingness to play ball with China over economic issues and Britain’s deepening trade relations with India, and so on to demonstrate this point.
So, then, are the G7 and BRICS irrelevant? Decidedly not. It is helpful to understand the international order as increasingly fragmentized, where the BRICS and G7 are progressively more important and expansive fora for cooperation. But uniformity is far from the only form of unity. There is space for disagreement between blocs that are generally aligned, as the G7 and NATO show us. In even the strictest groups, there is room for dissent; to once again torture the comparison to strict Canadian party discipline, fifteen Liberal MPs recently broke ranks to vote for an NDP bill to strengthen human rights provisions in Canada’s arms exports regime. No serious pundit has opined about an enduring mutiny within the Liberal ranks over it.
There is a multipolar world, and the BRICS is an important player in that state of things. Appreciating that simply requires a more nuanced, anti-monolithic conception of our multipolar moment.
Luca Rampersad is a fourth-year International Relations and Political Science (ASIP co-op) student. He was the 27th Editor-in-Chief of the Attaché Journal of International Affairs (2024-25). He currently serves alongside Mira Zola as Co-Editor-in-Chief for the 2025-26 year. Luca is also currently Co-Chair of Summit Studies at the BRICS Research Group.
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