The Attaché

Vivek Sapru | Originally Published: 4 April 2026

The border between India and China remains amongst the planet’s most volatile locations. The two emerging Asian powers, home to upwards of a billion people each and rapidly advancing economies, have remained at loggerheads for more than half a century. The border of the two Asian giants is their most obvious flashpoint and an important source of tensions in and of itself. In recent years, two particular incidents have formed the basis for continuing Sino-Indian border tensions: the 2017 Doklam Crisis and the 2020-2021 clashes. This essay will seek to recount the most recent Sino-Indian clashes and develop an understanding of the various conflicting motivations that drive the border conflict in the 21st century, in particular, and why the status quo in the Himalayas is likely to endure.

While the Sino-Indian border conflict has a long history stemming back to the post-World War Two period, the modern 21st century variation of the crisis is distinct. Rather than a full-scale war akin to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, disputes are marked by minor border clashes in specific contested regions. The Doklam crisis during the summer of 2017 is amongst the more recent examples of this, occurring at the conjunction of the Bhutanese, Chinese and Indian borders. In a nutshell, after China shut down a traditional route used by Hindu pilgrims through the Nathu La Pass, the world became aware of Chinese troop movements into a disputed area within Bhutan. Beginning on the 16th of June, a People’s Liberation Army group equipped with construction materials and “ten or twelve bulldozers” ventured into the disputed territory near an “Indian military post in Doka La pass [which overlooks]…the Doklam plateau” and began the construction of a new road aimed towards Bhutanese military positions. Despite the fact that this was not Indian territory (and nor did India harbour claims to it), it was of extreme strategic importance to Delhi that this segment of Bhutanese territory not be seized by China. Given the fact that parts of the Zompelri Ridge (in the Doklam area) overlook the narrow, vulnerable Siliguri corridor that connects India to its Eastern states, India decided to commit some of its forces into the area “to halt the construction.” The Bhutanese acquiesced to this in part because of their own material inability to enforce their sovereignty over the Doklam region. Some weeks later in August, the crisis expanded from Doklam into the nearby Pangong Tso sector where a clash occurred between “a Chinese patrol…[and] Indian Border troops.” This was perhaps the most significant moment of the Crisis; reports indicated that several soldiers from both sides were injured in the clash. The Crisis’ de-escalation began on the 28th of August after “simultaneous announcements” by the Chinese and Indian Governments regarding an agreement “to withdraw” troops from the disputed region. In the Crisis’ aftermath however, “reports based on satellite imagery” noted that China resumed its drive to “entrench itself in northern Doklam” and even constructed a “village…in Bhutanese territory.”

After a few years in which a Sino-Indian detente seemed possible — punctuated by several rounds of bilateral talks — another round of tension began in 2020. Beginning in the Spring, China stepped up its military buildup near border regions through increased troop deployments (including committing two whole divisions to the border), the “hardening [of] airfields and helipads” and by rectifying “air defence gaps.” The situation worsened in 2020 when it became clear that Chinese forces had encroached on Indian territory at several points across the Line of Actual Control (LAC): at “Pangong Tso, at [the Gogra] Hot Springs [in Ladakh], and in the Galwan Valley.” The latter incident was especially serious. Like the prior incidents in Doklam, the immediate source of contention were roadbuilding efforts by the Indian military in Ladakh, near the LAC and the controversial Aksai Chin region. Galwan marked a serious escalation in that it was the first time in decades that Chinese and Indian soldiers engaged in actual hand-to-hand combat and, more fundamentally, “Chinese forces shifted beyond merely conducting…patrols in the disputed borderlands…to physically occupying portions of the contested terrain.” Moreover, both sides suffered casualties: some estimates suggested that 20-45 Indian soldiers perished in the engagement and many more were injured or captured. While the precise number is unclear, analysts concur that the Chinese suffered fatalities too. 

While it may be easy to point to the comparatively recent 21st century Sino-Indian border clashes as a continuation of the same challenges that sparked confrontations like the 1962 Indo-China War or the 1967 Nathu La and Cho La border clashes in Sikkim, the current dispute ought to be viewed through a different lens entirely. Both parties have several rationales for their positions on the issue based on relevant geopolitical and domestic considerations.

One of the key reasons for continuing tensions between China and India is the fundamental mismatch between their perceptions of each other. On the Chinese side, a few schools of thought are present. Some officials seem to continue on in the tradition of the more amicable Sino-Indian relations in the 1950s by noting “that India’s economic, scientific, and military capabilities [are rising]…[though]…not as rapidly as China’s.” However, a more dominant outlook in China is somewhat dismissive of Indian concerns. India’s statements and ambitions regarding being a “major power” are considered “unrealistic and pretentious” in China. Indeed, some scholars have described China as viewing its relationship with India as a “non-zero-sum game between” a strong China and a comparatively weaker India, whereas the Indians view it as a “zero-sum game between” nations of equal standing. From Beijing’s perspective, the facts on the ground do not support India’s view of itself. China has an economy “five times larger than India’s” and is markedly superior in most technological and military-related metrics. There are two impacts of this mismatch in perspectives. Firstly, China is less inclined to seriously consider Indian appeals to historic agreements regarding the nature of the border since New Delhi is not viewed as an equal power on the world stage. Moreover, Beijing does not see clashes with Indian troops as a serious risk given the significant technological and material superiority of the Chinese military — India does not pose a considerable military threat. Another instance of the mismatch in perceptions between the two Asian rivals fueling their animosity on the border centres around the “Indian decision to transform Ladakh…into a union territory.” While New Delhi argues such a decision was one made purely based on domestic political reasons, Beijing viewed the federalization of a previously “autonomous state” bordering China as an inflammatory act. 

On the Chinese side of the LAC, another increasingly popular narrative justifies Chinese actions on the grounds of India’s “growing military ties with the United States.” In effect, this school of thought argues for more aggressive action against India because New Delhi is viewed as a “sub-power [directly] supported by the hegemon [the US]…the power [which China] is suppressed by.” As American defence imports continue to rise 一 a major shift given that New Delhi was historically reliant on Russian weapons systems 一 and as India increases participation in “US ‘foundational agreements’ to promote [military] inter-operability” like the Quadrilateral Grouping (the Quad), some in Beijing fear that India seeks to work with other nations to “check and balance China.” To that end, India is no longer viewed as a comparatively minor rival in and of itself, but as a major anti-China player in America’s pivot to Asia. While China’s “primary direction” remains the Pacific, its belligerent actions against India are intended as deterrence to prevent India from “taking advantage of a possible Taiwan contingency.”

Finally, there are significant domestic political incentives that might be partially responsible for China’s actions on the border, especially following the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019/2020. Some analysts have drawn parallels between China’s “increase[d]…friskiness” against India in the Himalayas and other nascent Chinese decisions like the “security law…to control Hong Kong.” In effect, Chinese policy regarding the border was effectively Beijing’s attempt to “push…back on all fronts” in the aftermath of the pandemic.

The primary source of a foreign response to China’s machinations on the border is, as one would expect, India. A key priority for Narendra Modi’s government has been bolstering India’s responses to foreign aggression, primarily emanating from Pakistan and China. To that end, India has responded in a multifaceted manner.

Despite its economic reliance on China, underlined by a 46 billion dollar trade deficit, the Indian government opted to enact certain policies to economically decouple from China as retaliation to continued border clashes. Several Chinese apps were “sanctioned” or banned with social media giant TikTok being a particularly notable case. Yet, economic pressure from India, while certainly appealing from a domestic populist perspective, is unlikely to successfully “pressurize China” given the size-gap in their respective GDPs. Indeed, some elements of India’s response to the 2020-2021 crisis were rolled back following a 2025 thaw in relations between Beijing and New Delhi. For instance, in 2025, India’s trade deficit with China rose dramatically to just shy of USD $100 billion.

With regards to the military infrastructure situation (a key topic in the Himalayan region), India does not wish for “China to unilaterally militarize the region.” As such, India has sought to step up the construction of infrastructure like paved highways, airbases and logistical supply depots in the vicinity of the border in both Ladakh and Sikkim. The most germane example of this infrastructure-based effort was New Delhi’s decision to construct infrastructure “in disputed areas near the…Line of Actual Control” at several points, including contested areas of Ladakh, the Aksai Chin, the Pangong Lake region and areas approaching the strategic Karakoram Pass. However, Indian efforts to match the Chinese infrastructure buildup near the border are hampered by the fact that India simply does not have the requisite level of resources and technological know-how to keep up with China’s buildup. India is further hindered by “its failure to encourage permanent settlement…on the part of its nomadic populations in these areas,” which has made it easier for China to seize “some 40–60 square kilometers of [Indian] territory” in disputed regions.  

The Indo-Chinese border conflict is likely to continue to linger into the near future as a potential flashpoint for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it serves as a convenient political distraction for the leadership of both nations. At times when the domestic political outlook may be inconvenient, be it economic woes for Modi or controversy around Xi Jinping’s ‘zero covid policy,’ the presence of a foreign distraction can allow both nations to rally nationalistic support against a perceived foreign aggressor. Secondly, there is no clear ultimate justification from either side that can solve the root issues underlying the border dispute. Both nations have different chronologies when it comes to the historical treaties concerning their border, many of which were formed before either nation existed in its modern incarnation. Finding diplomatic common ground is therefore impossible; it seems probable that the ad hoc LAC, monitored by the Indian and Chinese militaries, will remain the norm for the actual border. Thirdly, certain long-term trends suggest that the border will become of renewed importance for either side. As China embarks on a program of damming the crucial watersheds and rivers originating in Tibet, the Indian Government is likely to feel a need to increase pressure on Beijing, given Northern India’s reliance on the same rivers. Furthermore, so long as China continues to prop up Pakistan, India’s traditional rival, via military support and economic investment, India will perceive the militarization of its border as a way to counterbalance China and push back against Beijing.

Despite the likelihood of persisting tensions on the border, it seems improbable that any full-scale conflict akin to the 1962 Sino-Indian War will occur. While spontaneous clashes akin to the 2017 Doklam incident may occur at specific contested regions, neither side has the political will or military ability to wage a major offensive in the incredibly challenging Himalayan terrain. The future in the Himalayas, therefore, looks much akin to the present.

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