The Attaché

Vivek Sapru | Originally Published: 4 April 2026

From a certain angle, it would seem as though the Fashoda Incident (1898) and the Entente Cordiale (1904) were peculiar extremes of European imperialism, two opposing poles representing the best and worst sentiments between the British Empire and the French Third Republic. However, this outlook would be reductive and hamper a more insightful thesis. The sudden rise in Anglo-French tensions displayed by the Fashoda Incident and the unique rapprochement that followed through the Entente Cordiale are precisely interlinked because they reveal new power dynamics between, and incentives for, both London and Paris, hitherto non-existent for much of the two nation’s histories. These novel dynamics pushed them towards, at first, diplomatic amicability towards one another – certainly in contrast to their rather belligerent history for much of the second millennium – before achieving a very real concordat that would shape much of the 20th century. Analyzing Winston Churchill’s 1899 journal article on Fashoda and the Entente Cordiale’s text is therefore utile in understanding those explanatory factors that link these two seminal formative moments in world history at the turn of the 20th century.

The Fashoda Incident stemmed from the inevitable convergence of France and Britain’s colonial endeavours. More than a decade had passed after the mad dash of the ‘Scramble for Africa’ post-Berlin Conference (1884-85), and much of the Dark Continent had already been swallowed up by the major European powers. However, despite Britain’s status as a dominant proto-superpower during the Pax Britannica, each major power retained its own different visions for how Africa ought to be split. Of interest to this examination of the Fashoda Incident is the collision course between the aforementioned visions of Britain and France. As famously described by Cecil Rhodes, the British Empire in Africa aimed to stretch from “Cape to Cairo,” a vast territorial expanse arranged on a north-south axis stretching from Cairo, the Suez and the Mediterranean in the north to the Cape of Good Hope and South Africa at the bottom of the continent. On the other hand, the French, extrapolating from their pre-existing colonies in western and northwestern Africa (Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, etc.), sought to push on an east-west axis towards the Nile in Sudan. Some particularly ambitious French imperialists hoped to hoist the Tricolore as far east as the Red Sea, thereby creating a French band across Africa’s midriff by linking her West African colonies with her outpost in Djibouti. As a keen cartographer would no doubt have noticed – perhaps by drawing the above scenario in their mind’s eye – these visions were mutually exclusive. For Britain to effectuate her north-south vision would by definition preclude France’s east-west one (and vice versa). So, in the late 1890s, with much of Africa already seized, two expeditions from each side in the colonial race converged on a small town in contemporary South Sudan: Fashoda.

The French expedition, a plucky force of scarcely over 100 men (a dozen French officers along with Senegalese infantrymen), reached Fashoda first. Under Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand’s leadership, the French had set off from Brazzaville in the French Congo more than a year before their arrival at the White Nile on July 10th, 1898. Their journey initially took them up the Congo River, before an arduous march on foot brought them to the crumbling, abandoned Fort of Fashoda. While part of the motivation for the Marchand Expedition has been covered above (namely, the east-west vision), there are other factors worth noting. Despite a presence in Egypt dating back to Napoleon I’s conquest of it in 1798, the French hold had recently faltered because of their decision not to participate in a British-led occupation in 1882. Thus, the Marchand expedition was not just a maximalist attempt to grow the French African Empire, but was also inspired by a desire to pressure Britain into considering adjustments in relative influence in Egypt (by using a Sudanese fait accompli as a bargaining chip).

The British side was significantly larger, owing to its origins in a full-fledged war. Years after the initial Sudanese Mahdist Revolt and the infamous defeat of a besieged British force under General ‘Chinese’ Gordon at Khartoum, London had at last bowed to public pressure and reconciled itself to financing, supporting and directing a major military expedition against the Dervishes. Yet, euphoria over General Kitchener’s decisive success over the Sudanese at Omdurman was short-lived. A strong contingent was promptly redirected further south to preemptively secure Fashoda as awareness of the emerging French threat – beyond a presence on the Nile’s Bahr el Ghazal tributary and towards Fashoda on the White Nile itself – grew in Whitehall. Despite his significantly superior strength in numbers and equipment, and the added benefit of steamboat transportation upstream, Kitchener arrived in September – too late.

Moving beyond the historical context and to Churchill’s article illuminates Britain’s internal and external perspectives on the developing Fashoda Crisis. Firstly, he stressed how Britain took the Marchand Expedition as a serious breach of trust akin to a perfidious French backstab. His rhetoric here is withering, claiming that “[the French] occupation of Fashoda…gave place to a deep and bitter anger” before adding that “a ‘friendly Power’ had, unprovoked, endeavoured to rob them [the British] of the fruits of their victories [in Sudan].” These fighting words reinforced British claims to Fashoda by labelling the latter as under the auspices of Mahdist sovereignty given their state’s geographic extent (and therefore, Fashoda ought to be controlled the Anglo-Egyptian expedition following their victory over the same) while stirring up emotions by stressing the courage and sacrifice of British troops in Sudan (which, it should be noted, included Churchill himself – perhaps a self-aggrandizement that would benefit his later political career). Secondly, Churchill emphasizes that all levels of British society were steadfastly “determined to have Fashoda or fight.” Despite their comparatively positive view of France in the lead-up to Fashoda, Churchill notes the resolve of the British Government, Opposition, populace and military to oppose Marchand’s fait accompli, making it clear that there were no doves in Britain for Paris to negotiate with. Thirdly, in the article’s second half, Churchill adeptly shifted to a more conciliatory tone – important to facilitate a face-saving settlement – by downplaying France’s chance for success against Kitchener’s contingent without indigenous African support, while also asserting that France did not actually seek escalation to a territorial conflict because of the mutually beneficial territorial settlement following Fashoda. The latter point in the article is intriguing in that it augurs the latter Entente, which itself included a mutually beneficial demarcation bestowing Britain control of “the whole drainage system of the Nile” and France “Northern Africa west of the Nile Valley.” Yet, even then, in typically adroit fashion, Churchill slipped in a slight backhanded blow by noting that, aside from the pleasing aesthetics of “paint[ing]…the [African] map in the French blue,” France received the shorter end of the stick. Much of France’s newly recognized territory was more of a “sphere of aspiration” for Paris than a fully-integrated colony, and, because of the higher time and resource commitment required to profit from those regions, generally less valuable than Britain’s African possessions. 

Thus, Churchill’s early oeuvre clarifies the power dynamics of the Anglo-French dynamics. The British military advantage tactically (at Fashoda) and strategically (considering the entirety of either side’s global capabilities) was so significant that Paris could not risk armed conflict, certainly not over a distant, muddy hovel. Churchill’s assessment of Britain’s resolve seems to have been accurate insofar as it deterred Paris; the intended French fait accompli had been averted. Moreover, France could ill afford to further antagonize the rival it so dearly needed on its side to balance against the rising Kaiserreich for such little benefit.

Yet, there were indeed some mutual benefits to be reaped. Perusing through the actual text of the Entente Cordiale helps carry forward our thesis of the developing ties between London and Paris being premised on the influence on the internalization of the areas of alignment between their respective interests, and their hard power differences in Africa and beyond. Contrary to popular belief, the Entente Cordiale solely concerns Africa. European affairs do not feature in it at all, despite its common association with the Franco-British alliance during World War I. This noteworthy omission does not impugn the link between the Fashoda settlement and the cross-Channel alliance in 1914. Rather, it reinforces the linear progression from colonial rivals to wartime allies that began with the resolution of Fashoda. In essence, the Entente formalized and expanded the amicable division of African interests that began as the settlement immediately after Fashoda. On the one hand, the agreement facilitated the institutionalization of Britain’s already preeminent position in the ‘veiled protectorate’ of Egypt by removing France’s financial leverage in the debt system. Britain would proceed to pay off Egypt’s debt with the knowledge that Paris’ agreement to the secret articles of the treaty would prevent her impingement. However, the genius of the Entente was that France, even if proportionately less, benefited too. In Egypt itself, France gained various symbolic privileges, like guarantees for French schools and French control of the position of Director-General of Antiquities. While France continued to lose out on direct governance of Egypt (which, it is worth noting, it already had less influence on post-1882), it received symbolic benefits that were visible to the public. Finally, Britain took the significant step of officially recognizing Morocco as within the French sphere. While Morocco was of little interest to London, the act itself shows the ability for the two to come together diplomatically. Regardless of who benefited more, the story of Fashoda and the Entente is one in which Britain and France found their place and feelings about one another.

References 

1. Churchill, Winston. “The Fashoda Incident.” In Archives of Empire, edited by Mia Carter and Barbara Harlow. Duke University Press, 2003.

2. Cockfield, Jamie. “Germany and the Fashoda Crisis, 1898-1899.” Central European History 16, no. 3 (1983): 256-75. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938900013959.

3. Eubank, Keith. “The Fashoda Crisis Re-examined.” The Historian 22, no. 2 (1960): 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6563.1960.tb01649.x.

4. Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War. New York: Random House, 1991.

5. The Avalon Project. “The Entente Cordiale Between England and France – April 8, 1904.”. Accessed March 26, 2025. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/entecord.asp