The Attaché

Zainab Ibraheem | Originally Published: 6 December 2025

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. While some hailed him as the saviour of the Arab world, others likened him to Hitler. Evidently, Nasser’s actions were not viewed uniformly. This article argues that following the Suez Canal’s nationalization, the world witnessed an interplay between Orientalism and Occidentalism as differing parties sought to legitimize their responses to the Suez Crisis. 

Before analyzing evidence of this argument through newspaper excerpts and individual statements, it is crucial to define Orientalism and Occidentalism. As explained by Wang Ning, Orientalism can be understood as the West’s reading of the East – a lens which is often riddled with prejudices built on colonialist ideology. To expand, in the words of Edward Said, Orientalism involves the view that Westerners are rational, peaceful, and “capable of holding real values,” while Arab-Orientals “are none of these things.” Occidentalism is more challenging to define. One can say it is simply the reverse of Orientalism, i.e. the East’s skewed perception of the West. In this view, as described by Abdullah Metin, the West is reduced to being self-interested, colonialist, and money-grubbing. It is important to note, however, that due to historical power imbalances, Occidentalism as a lens does not possess the same capacity to be used for domination. Nonetheless, in the Suez Crisis, I posit that European powers promoted Oriental narratives about Nasser while counteracting Occidental perceptions of themselves. Furthermore, I contend that Nasser contested these Oriental portrayals, and promoted his own Occidental views of the European powers.

Beginning with European figures, we can look to a 1956 Los Angeles Times article which details French Premier Guy Mollet’s statements about Nasser. Mollet declared that Nasser’s book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, may be more appropriately named Mein Kampf, and noted that “[to] violence, [France and free nations] will offer the calm determination of those who are really strong.” Mollet’s assertion uncovers evidence of an Oriental narrative as he reproduces the binary entrenched in Orientalism. In other words, Nasser is painted as violent and radical, while Mollet and his Western allies are level-headed. Conversely, in a New York Times article, French Ambassador to the U.S. Hervé Alphand is recorded stating, “the motives behind French policies are neither selfish nor rooted in the past, [and that] France knows…so-called colonialism is obsolete.” This quote embodies an attempt to dispel Occidental characterizations of the West as “blood-sucking imperialists,” in Nasser’s words. This is all to say, the statements of both authors privilege the viewpoint that Nasser’s actions and perceptions were categorically wrong. The authors assert that not only was Nasser dangerous, but also that the European leaders were well-meaning and responding accordingly. This dichotomy between right and wrong was critical for garnering the public’s support for potential confrontations with Nasser and easing the skepticism of anti-imperialists at home and abroad. 

As for Nasser and his approach to using ideologies, we can look to a 1956 Chicago Daily Tribune article, wherein Nasser responds to European leaders’ claims that he violated international law by nationalizing the Suez Canal. Dispelling Orientalist characterizations of him as irrational and volatile, Nasser stated that Egypt did not break a single international agreement and that he would moreover uphold the 1888 Freedom of Navigation Convention. Further, in speaking about Anglo-French proposals for international control of the canal, Nasser declared that internationalization was an imperialistic creation rooted in seizure and domination. He also characterized the Anglo-French proposal as an attempt to use money as a means to to spark disunity among Arabs. Analysis of Nasser’s statements showcases his propagation of the Occidental view that the West is self-interested and motivated by material gains. Evidently, Nasser favours the viewpoint that his actions were consistent with international law and that the solutions suggested by European powers cannot be trusted. These guided conclusions carry immense weight for Nasser’s audience which was composed not only of Arabs drawn in by the promises of dignity and liberation, but also of concerned Europeans who questioned his credibility. 

Clearly, the two parties – Nasser and European figures – present opposing perspectives. However, both employ a common strategy: they deliberately omit discussions of any personal actions that might reveal contradictions in their arguments. For instance, Alphand did not explain France’s reasoning for its attachments to Algeria and other North African nations at the time, which were waging anti-colonial uprisings against the French. Nor did Nasser’s calls for Arab unity acknowledge that he himself had been part of regional rivalries and contributed to division among Arab nations. By removing these key details, both individuals can reinforce their lines of thinking: Alphand portrayed France as a benevolent, rational power, while Nasser positioned himself as the voice of anti-imperialism and Arab unity. Ultimately, these omissions reveal how both European leaders and Nasser manipulated Oriental and Occidental narratives to shape public opinion and justify their polar responses to the crisis.

Undoubtedly, historical context and concurrent events matter for understanding the significance of these ideological narratives and their desired conclusions. Aside from the examples above, European leaders’ outward dismissals of Occidental perceptions were necessary due to the Cold War and the East/West divide. The West could not afford for the Middle East to be alienated or polarized, for it could then fall to Communism. Given that the Suez Canal’s nationalization took place against the backdrop of the Cold War, one of the primary concerns of Western powers was to ensure states remained in the capitalist camp. As such, Occidentalist worries about imperialist activity had to be addressed and placated, especially given Europe’s vividly imperial reputation. Likewise, Nasser’s insistence on Arab unity and use of Occidental narratives can be attached to the broader decolonization movement. His statements frame European criticisms as part of a larger imperialist campaign, and they thus allow him to harness the solidarity and growing anti-colonial fervour of the Middle East. 

The narratives presented in the sources examined  reflect a striking lesson about Middle Eastern history at large: binaries, dichotomies, and stereotypes are a consistent variable in East-West relations, albeit evolving throughout time. Initially, we may learn about Orientalism as entailing a mystified, exotic image of the Near East and a modernized vision of the West. With time, however, Orientalism can take new shapes, instead positioning Middle Easterners as radical and dangerous, and Westerners as rational. Similarly, Occidentalism may have been related to anti-imperialism but now also ties into critiques of secularism and perceived immorality. These binaries, rooted in Orientalist/Occidentalist thinking and apparent in the Suez Crisis, continue to persist in the region today, as exemplified by the War on Terror and the Palestinian question. 

For instance, it can be argued that this concept is visible in Israel’s ongoing genocide of Palestinians, wherein supporters of both camps are attempting to dispel the respective Orientalist/Occidentalist stereotypes associated with them. To illustrate, Arabs must openly condemn violence to avoid being associated with terrorism, considering that terrorism has become attached to the Middle East in a new manifestation of neo-Orientalism, as explained by Silke Schmidt. Similarly, Western nations have to overtly display their humanitarianism to avoid labels tied to imperialism and self-interest.

Given the parallels between the Orientalist and Occidental discourse surrounding the Suez Crisis and narratives underpinning current events, the first-hand statements from Guy Mollet, Hervé Alphand, and Gamal Abdel Nasser remain relevant to us today. Through their demonstration of the interplay between Orientalism and Occidentalism, these statements reveal that charged rhetoric has consistently been used to construct contrasting identities and justify political decisions in the face of global scrutiny. Further, this analysis is particularly useful for students of the Middle East as it allows them to make sense of the current prejudices and narratives operating in the West and East and their respective origins. Overall, the sources examined underline the significance of public opinion and how ideological tools, whether in the past or present, are utilized by leaders to foster support for controversial policies on the international stage.

References 

1. Arnot, Charles P. “Egypt Defies West; Will Meet Aggression–Nasser: Egyptian President Will Not Change on Suez Canal.” Atlanta Daily World (Atlanta, GA). July 29, 1956. https://www.proquest.com/docview/491089226/E9F9059FDE3E495DPQ/2?accountid=14771&sourcetype=Historical%20Newspapers

2. Bigart, Homer. “Dulles Sees British and French To Discuss Next Move on Suez: New Paris Ambassador Calls Nasser ‘Dictator’–Reports Studied by Eisenhower Working for Compromise Sees Threat of Blackmail.” New York Times (New York, NY). Sept. 9, 1956. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fhistorical-newspapers%2Fdulles-sees-british-french-discuss-next-move-on%2Fdocview%2F113740318%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D14771

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