Paul Hindoian | Originally Published: 27 March 2026
Bulgaria is fighting an internal, fragmented crusade against corruption that is tearing the country apart. This conflict reached a breaking point in 2021, where the former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and his Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party became the subject of mass protests in response to an embezzlement scandal. Since then, Bulgarian politics have been paralyzed, with seven election cycles taking place in just four years.
The legacy of Borisov and figures like him has been the moralization of corruption. Through their scandals and antagonism, they have aggressively transformed the political approach to corruption in their country: it is no longer a systematic issue to be addressed through partisan cooperation and has rather become a means for division within the Bulgarian parliament. Corruption now is not a national project to undertake but is instead an effective tool for antagonistic rhetoric against political opposition; a tool which attracts votes. Specifically, Bulgarian parties find success by campaigning on the idea that they are relatively pure, and if elected, they will address the “embodiment of corruption” that is their opposition. It is as if each voter must use their democratic influence to endorse a champion who will fight to defeat the lion of corruption.
Corruption truly is a pervasive threat to Bulgarian quality of life, and voters know this. Why then do crusades against corruption lead to political instability and an immobilized government? The answer lies in recognizing that to function efficiently, the Bulgarian government must have a unified majority. To achieve a majority, coalitions must form, which is difficult if doing so would challenge the ideological foundation of your party. If a party campaigns against the corrupt other, then it cannot later justify agreeing to form a partnership with them.
This leaves Parliament trapped in an insidious cycle where parties are effectively at war with each other. It is not surprising then that the government collapses quickly, and while it exists, it is unable to do much, including fighting corruption. Consequently, corruption only deepens, and frustrated Bulgarians in the hundreds of thousands protest short-lived governments, in the hope that in the next election things may change. The rate of elections is also in part a product of the inherent instability of highly ideologized political actors operating within a democratic system. Given that the authority of a party is based on the authenticity of its actions relative to their ideology, a simple scandal may shake the integrity of the government so deeply that another election becomes necessary.
Today, Bulgaria is in a state of crisis. Nearly two decades after joining the EU, Bulgaria remains the union’s poorest member, and economic and political stagnation remain an ongoing national feature, present since the state was under Soviet rule. The 2025 European Commission Rule of Law Report rightfully points out that Bulgaria is managing corruption poorly, and that institutions remain weak. Confidence in the courts is nearly non-existent, and Bulgarians are losing faith in their country, evidenced by high rates of emigration and frequent protests.
What Bulgaria desperately needs is internal political cooperation. In the past, significant external threats or unifying national projects have managed to produce a common set of priorities which enabled the formation of stable coalitions to be politically feasible. In the late 90s/early 2000s, the threat of Balkan marginalization and the widespread desire for Euro-Atlantic integration allowed Bulgarian parties to mobilize and coordinate efforts towards the fruition of a common goal. This goal being accession into the EU and NATO. In contrast, today the common goal is the eradication of corruption, which as discussed, is divisive rather than unifying. Either this goal must change, or incentives for cooperation must be implemented.
In the absence of a unifying national project, coalition signalling before elections could become a useful tool to encourage cooperation and promote accountability. If incentives can be offered to parties who declare a willingness to form a coalition upon election, then anti-corruption rhetoric from these parties would become more accommodating, and the feasibility of a stable government would improve. There is already somewhat encouraging precedent for this solution. In 2024, Bulgaria’s largest parties, GERB-SDS and the reformist We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria managed to publicly draft a joint resolution before the election outlining how governance responsibilities and decision-making power would be distributed. This was a reasonably robust agreement and was a definite positive step towards easing inter-party conflict.
Still, the election crisis was not solved in 2024. Although a willingness to cooperate was expressed, these parties retained many of their alienating ideological values, and voters and party members would often see a close partnership as betrayal. Because of the described mechanism for the moralization of corruption, the foundation of this coalition was shaky to begin with. For years prior, these groups found political success by attacking each other through claims of fraud; now that they are working together, it is only natural that ideology should remain a barrier to good-hearted collaboration.
There are plenty of practical policy changes which could help ease Bulgaria out of political deadlock; nonetheless, without a change in the attitude parties take towards corruption and towards each other, the crisis will not be resolved. The system currently incentivizes antagonism and slow coalition building. Elected parties can blame inaction on a corrupt system which they are powerless to face, and the president is incentivized not to address instability. This is because the resignation of an elected government allows the president to install a caretaker government of their own choosing.
The Bulgarian case is frustrating, but hope can be found in the strength of the country’s people. Voters are unwilling to tolerate indefinite corruption and deadlock and are clearly willing to keep their politicians accountable. As the Bulgarian populace continues to demand a unified, capable government, leaders will be incentivized to cooperate. Clearly, Bulgaria does not want gladiators. They want a republic that can overcome stagnation and that has the cohesion to follow the development of fellow EU members in the pursuit of a stronger nation, capable of offering prosperity and opportunity.
References
1. “Bulgaria Country Risk Report: Gan Integrity.” Bulgaria country risk report | GAN Integrity. Accessed February 16, 2026. https://www.ganintegrity.com/country-profiles/bulgaria/.
2. Bahnsen, Oke, Thomas Gschwend, and Lukas F. Stoetzer. “How Do Coalition Signals Shape Voting Behavior? Revealing the Mediating Role of Coalition Expectations.” Electoral Studies 66 (August 2020): 102166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102166.
3. Ewb. “Policy Brief: Protest Parties in Bulgaria Should Learn to Govern and Translate Citizens’ Expectations into Policies.” European Western Balkans, August 8, 2023. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/08/08/policy-brief-protest-parties-in-bulgaria-should-learn-to-govern-and-translate-citizens-expectations-into-policies/.
4. Golder, Sona N. “Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Comparative Perspective: A Test of Existing Hypotheses.” Electoral Studies 24, no. 4 (December 2005): 643–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2005.01.007.
5. Henley, Jon. “Bulgarian Government Resigns after Mass Anti-Corruption Protests.” The Guardian, December 11, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/11/bulgarian-government-resigns-mass-anti-corruption-protests?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
6. Hiller, Tobias. “Measuring the Difficulties in Forming a Coalition Government.” Games 14, no. 2 (March 31, 2023): 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020032.
7. “2025 Rule of Law Report.” European Commission. Accessed February 16, 2026. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle/2025-rule-law-report_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
8. Todorov, Antony. The role of political parties in the Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. Accessed February 17, 2026. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28944/25.pdf.
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