Ngila Stone | Originally Published: 14 February 2026
Throughout the 20th century, the world witnessed the rise and fall of a political and ideological system in the form of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In a century scarred with wars on a scale previously unseen, it is understandable to succumb to the belief that the underlying ideological battle between Western capitalism and communism also concluded. The collapse of the USSR is in the popular imagination, that breaking point; perhaps it is one. For all political and economic purposes, the fallout has led to a movement towards capitalist legislation in the remaining communist countries. China is often cited as an example of this effort, given its increased prominence in the global economy following both the end of the USSR and the death of hardliners of the old movement like Mao Zedong. However, this macro view fails to acknowledge the continuities that still exist across the communist world, which prompts the question of: to what extent can ideological systems survive political turmoil, especially between states? Looking at the most recent 2024 Land Law of Vietnam and comparing it to the Soviet constitution showcases that the mask of political turmoil or economic modernization hides an unshaken ideological framework.
Vietnam and the USSR have been described both during the Cold War and after the fact as “friends.” This term, loaded with diplomatic nuance, was solidified through an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1978 that promised to usher in a time of peaceful support and unity between the two countries; something of which, at the time, both were in need. Vietnam was preparing to enter into yet another military engagement against Pol Pot’s Cambodia, and the USSR was able to gain a local ally. On the surface, this alliance had strong military and economic implications, with theorists of the time arguing that it was a clear attempt by which the USSR could gain control over Southeast Asia to block a similar Chinese effort following the effects of the Sino-Soviet split. Similarly, Vietnam had been fighting brutal wars for over two decades and needed the support of a larger, richer ally in order to maintain the necessary resources to campaign.
This reading of the agreement is not without foundation; it deals primarily, however, with political realities and not ideological ones. Later analysis of the agreement recognizes that while the 1978 agreement played a large role in setting up mutually beneficial political relations, it was full of language directly discussing the necessity of communist or socialist unity across the world. It underlines the need to base their alliance on the foundation of shared commitment to a singular ideology, by preserving key tenets alongside in strengthening and protecting socialist achievements. This factor will become increasingly important when discussing the current Vietnamese Land Law.
In stark contrast to treaties of friendship and cooperation, the relations between China and Vietnam have been antagonistic in various ways, since well before communism. For centuries, their shared border was the root of both alliance and war, leading to a modern reality that would have been complex without the added weight of ideology. Near the beginning of the Cold War period, China was critical to the Vietnamese communist movement as an ally and backer. However, this changed during the Vietnam War, when a complete breakdown occurred in what Nicholas Khoo referred to as an “indestructible” friendship. This broken alliance culminated in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict; this conflict was also aggravated by the formation of a partnership between the USSR and Vietnam.
Nonetheless, a decade later, as the Cold War drew to a close, Vietnam and China decided it would be best to maintain cordial relations, especially due to their shared communist political identities. Yet, this proved to be a struggle. As the 20th century became the 21st, there were ongoing disputes surrounding economic interests, the South China Sea, and influence in Southeast Asia. Those analysing this political conflict have mused about the irony of two ideologically aligned states having such a poor diplomatic connection, and while there is truth in that, it is important to recall that it is the ideology that seemingly maintains any relations between the two at all, given their political and social history with each other.
With this political context in mind, the 2024 Vietnamese Land Law gains a new meaning. This law, at first glance, may seem unrelated to international affairs, but it is in fact intrinsically tied to them. Land is fundamental to any economic framework. Whether it is used for agricultural production or as space to build factories, the way land is regulated domestically determines how the economy can function, and this is a fact well recognized by the communist worldview. Article 6 of the 1936 Soviet constitution sets aside a strict definition of ownership as follows:
“The land… [is] state property, that is, the possession of the whole people.”
This legal precedent imagines a system by which the state government would be the sole owner of land and would distribute it as it sees fit, providing for the people. This system aligns with the communist belief in redistribution and equality among people. It also creates a very specific economic condition by which industry can only grow with the permission and partnership of the state. This is what is viewed today as the traditional communist approach, something that, in theory, Vietnam and China have both moved away from in their efforts to engage with the global market.
Now, almost 90 years later, looking at the newest form of Vietnamese land law, it is possible to make a direct legal comparison between the two documents in the wording and strategy in Article 1:
“This Law provides for regulations on land ownership of the people, powers and responsibilities of the State to represent land ownership of the people and unify management of land, regulations on management and use of land, rights and obligations of citizens and land users in relation to land in the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”
It is clear that the direct approach of stating outright control over land has been traded for a more subtle acknowledgement of the responsibility of the state to represent the “ownership of the people” in an effort to “unify management.” While in the subsequent articles of the Land Law, the allowance for foreign investment, diversification of types of leases and ownerships, and an emphasis on further autonomy for certain organisations, all point towards a legal ‘modernization’, this opening article, at its core, contains the same sentiments as those in the Vietnamese Land Laws that have come before it.
This image of continuity is given further evidence by examining Chinese land and property laws:
“The People’s Republic of China practises socialist public ownership of land, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. Ownership by the whole people means that the right of ownership in State-owned land is exercised by the State Council on behalf of the State.”
The language used is not only extremely similar, but, as before, it envisions the same kind of economic and social framework as both the USSR and Vietnam.
Returning to the political context explored above, the reality of these laws does not quite seem to fit. Politically, it has been interpreted that over the course of the 20th century, and now into the 21st, both Vietnam and China have ‘modernized’ or rather taken on broad capitalist economic practices in order to join the world order following the USSR’s collapse. For example, Vietnam has gone through intensive legal interventions from Western states such as the United States in order to help them normalize their diplomatic relations. These were both only somewhat successful and poorly received, focusing mostly on laws concerning social issues or trade economics. Land, while considered, was not a top concern. Another example is the Doi Moi movement, when in 1986 the Vietnamese government instituted sweeping reforms to create a strong market economy. This occurred alongside the economic reforms put in place by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, which the global community saw as a sign that, in chasing success in global markets and pursuing economic stability, these states were compromising their communist ideology. Vietnam and China’s continued public animosity for each other has painted, for the international community, a picture of a faded communist ideology that was unable to withstand the global political reality.
There is a factor of truth to that analysis, but again centering land as the basis for any economic or social system, it becomes strikingly clear that despite the passage of time or political changes it is the ideology itself that has remained, with as much strength as it has had for the better part of a century—at least in the eyes of the law.
In modern-day discussions over their fraught relations, diplomats of both China and Vietnam have pointed to the pillar of ideology that remains as a binding force between them. The same framework set out by the USSR, which sought to create greater social equity, is alive in the form of current legal orders in both China and Vietnam. The political discord between these three states, which has been subject to decades of analysis and exploration, was unable to deteriorate the core premise of ideology which united all three of them. The fundamental understanding of land has not changed. Due to this simple fact, Vietnam’s 2024 Land Law still follows through on its 1978 friendship agreement and the furthering of communist ideology, even in the face of political and economic pressures from the rest of the global community. The link remains, even when it seems to be trading in this ideology for shares in a market economy.
Through the lens of the 2024 Land Law and the understanding of land as a basis for economic and social ideology, it is evident that while it has been easy for observers to let the fall of the USSR mark a turning point in all aspects of communist life, states like Vietnam continue to hold fast to these ideological tenets. While there have been changes in policy, changes in fundamental understanding are another thing entirely. The complex weaving of relationships between these three states has been the source of both rhetorical and armed conflict; China and Vietnam have a number of ongoing disputes which coexist with a shared foundation. In conducting political analysis, it is necessary to incorporate this idea; otherwise, the narratives produced are both incomplete as they fail to recognize how much has not changed. To adopt momentarily Cold War era analysis, inter-state affairs are not all about political acumen or consolidation of power. States can have unshakable frameworks and do not wish to concede their foundations even today.
References
1. Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Moscow, Kremlin. December 5, 1936. https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1936/1936-constitution.pdf
2. Duong, Van Huy. “Vietnam’s Current Perceptions and Policies Regarding Its Relations with China.” Strategic Analysis 47, no. 6 (2023): 547-564. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2024.2311477
3. Khoo, Nicholas. Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2011.
4. National Assembly of Vietnam. Land Law: Hanoi, January 18, 2024. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/vie224675.pdf
5. Navrozov, P., E. Plotnikov, and Michel Vale. “Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship-a Factor of Peace and Construction.” Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade 21, no. 1/2/3 (1985): 204–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27748836.
6. Pike, Douglas. “The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp.” Asian Survey 19, no. 12 (1979): 1159–70. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643962.
7. Rose, Carol V. “The ‘New’ Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study.” Law & Society Review 32, no. 1 (1998): 93–140. https://doi.org/10.2307/827750.
8. Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress. Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China: Beijing, August 28, 2004. http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383939.htm
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