An Examination of the Canadian Perspective on America’s War in Vietnam
Siya Duggal | Originally Published: 27 March 2026
From 1964 to 1975, war plagued a Southeast Asian country known as Vietnam to some and Indochina to others. Transpiring during the Cold War, the Vietnam War was a notable battle between capitalist and communist forces. It was often deemed “America’s war” as the Americans supported capitalist South Vietnam in a battle against communist North Vietnam. However, Canada was also “heavily involved – for and against.”
Canadians in the U.S. Armed Forces
Canadians supported the American policy of protecting the world against communism. Many Canadian foreign service officers first encountered communism in Vietnam, and they did “not like” nor “respect what they” saw. Stationed in Vietnam, Canadian Thomas Delworth explained that public dislike of communism played a significant role in dictating Canadian wartime policies. In pursuit of their desire to fight against communism, some Canadians broke laws prohibiting enlistment and travelled south to enlist in US forces. Nearly 30,000 Canadians enlisted. US forces welcomed these Canadians and “treated [them] like U.S. recruits.” However, unlike American recruits, they were not given post-war medical benefits, leading to protests that eventually succeeded in 1988. Additionally, some Canadians, namely, Don Echlin, wished to create a Canadian unit. Echlin believed Southeast Asia needed to be defended, and if America reverted to isolationism, the free world would cripple. He also argued that the Canadian government refuses to participate solely to avoid criticism that follows “spilling blood.” Echlin’s desire to create a Canadian unit remained unfulfilled when Toronto’s American consulate approved his request, but only if Canada’s government approved.
From Fighting Communism to Opposing Violence
Nonetheless, while Canadians initially viewed communism as a force to be fought against, as violence increased, many protested against the war, calling on the Canadian government to “do something.” Toronto hosted a peaceful sidewalk protest involving 5000 demonstrators, including many draft dodgers. Other protestors wrote letters requesting meetings with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. However, they received limited responses, which either contained an apology from Trudeau or a memo stating the Prime Minister was unable to meet them. A Toronto Rabbi, Abraham Fineberg, argued the violence perpetrated against prisoners of war after WWII caused many to view the US Department of Defence’s (DOD) headquarters, the Pentagon, as “the centre of evil.” He exemplified through a protester’s desire to take a flower into the Pentagon and further elucidated that individuals see both communism and “the Pentagon…[as] the embodiment of the devil.” Anti-Americanism developed as Canadians deemed Vietnam America’s “dirty little war,” and Canadian historians called on the government to encourage American withdrawal.
The Canadian Government’s Policy: Feigning Ignorance
While the public protested against violence, the Canadian government supported US defences. Although Canada was officially “not in the business of sending arms to dangerous areas,” Canadian businesses filled American defence contracts throughout the war. Supplied products included explosives, munitions, aircraft engines, aircraft launching equipment, and maintenance crews. To bypass the official policy, Canadian manufacturers “played dumb,” by arguing they were unaware of products’ final destinations. Journalists revealed that the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), a government-run corporation, mediated trade between Canadian businesses and the US DOD. These journalists argued the CCC knew all about the requested products, including final destinations. Given the CCC’s role and the discovery that the US designated $3 million of Canadian-manufactured defence goods in 1974 towards “operations in Southeast Asia,” historians and journalists struggled to believe the government’s claims that materials are not sent to dangerous areas. Nonetheless, throughout the conflict, the Canadian government followed the British tradition of secrecy and sustained its efforts to hide differences between practices and policies. Even after the conflict, historians researching the Canadian government’s policies argued it was easier to obtain sources from America.
Canadians Protest Against The War
Consequently, protests transpired once Daniel Ellsberg, a Rand Corporation employee consulting for the US government, leaked sections of the Pentagon Papers. These papers detailed American policies towards Vietnam and also included information surrounding Canada’s role. Canadians protested upon discovering, through these papers and additional reports, that their government had lied to them. Many protested upon discovering in 1981 that in “June 1966, the American army tested Agent Orange [the Vietnam War’s most infamous chemical agent] in Canada.” Following these demonstrations, Canada’s government allocated nearly $100 million as compensation for Canadians harmed by this testing. Similarly, Canadians protested against the DOW Chemical Company, which produced napalm, another chemical weapon used in the war. Demonstrators are appalled that the company recruited University of Toronto students, and through university protests, dissenting Canadians successfully stopped recruitment.
Arrival of Draft Dodgers: Americans Fleeing to Canada
Alongside Canadians protesting militarism, some Americans attempted to avoid enlistment during the war; these Americans are known as draft dodgers/resisters. Many draft dodgers fled to Canada, and Canada welcomed them with open arms. Canada used this opportunity to highlight it is independent of the United States and to convey Canada’s resistance to the war. Moreover, the government considered these “young, middle-class, and educated” draft dodgers ideal immigrants. With the implementation of the point system – a system requiring potential immigrants to earn at least 50 points to be considered – and the publishing of information manuals regarding the new system, immigration became simple for draft resisters. As English speakers, post-secondary degree holders, and job seekers, draft dodgers easily earned points. Nonetheless, discrimination persisted in Canadian policies, as African Americans and those with little post-secondary education were unwelcome. Similarly, deserters – enlisted Americans wishing to escape serving in US forces – encountered complications. Deserters usually lacked education, job skills, and family support, and despite orders not to consider draft status, “some immigration officials… [use] military status as a category in their assessment of potential Landed Immigrants.”
To avoid public resentment and resolve confusion, Canada’s minority Liberal government passed an official policy in May 1969 stating that “liability for service in the armed forces of another country, including desertion, therefore, will not be taken into account in assessing a person’s admissibility to Canada as an Immigrant.” In doing so, Canada went against its NATO allies, whose procedure is to arrest deserters from “other member countries and return them” to their homeland’s authorities. Canada was the sole American Cold War ally to pass such legislation; the closest second being Sweden, which provided asylum to deserters but not immigrant status. Historians justified Canada’s controversial policy by referencing US actions in the two world wars and the Vietnam War; the US never returned Canadians who fled WWI and WWII conscription or those who enlisted in the US army during the Vietnam War. The desire to reverse the “brain drain” yielded by Canadians moving to the US for employment and education also influenced government policy. To further increase Canadian policy’s ambiguity, while allowing draft dodgers and deserters, Canada cooperates with the US regarding security measures, as the RCMP and FBI partner to maintain surveillance on the escapees. Deserters who seem communist or otherwise suspicious are deported despite the 1969 policy. For instance, three newly immigrated deserters who asked an RCMP officer about laws governing hitchhiking were handed over to US border authorities. This demonstrates that while Canada was more humanitarian than the US, it maintained an anti-communist stance throughout the Vietnam War.
Not only did Canada’s government welcome deserters and draft resisters, but so did the public and churches. Draft dodgers featured in many news stories as Canadians formed support groups, including the Toronto Anti-Draft Program. These support groups set up housing allowing for young Canadians and Americans to mingle. Churches provided funding to these immigrant aid groups, and the Canadian Council of Churches received money from around the globe. The United Church of Canada frowns upon America’s actions in Vietnam, blaming “the American political and national ego for the death of thousands of human beings and the wasting of an entire subcontinent.” The Church, while still holding considerable power, was losing its influence as “religion seemed to be less relevant.” Thus, alongside nationalism and anti-Americanism, wishing “to appear more vital and relevant,” motivated Canadian churches to support draft resisters.
Canada as the North-South Mediator
Additionally, Canada serves as a messenger, or in historian Andrew Preston’s words, a “middle power,” between foreign parties, South Vietnam’s Capital, Saigon, and North Vietnam’s Capital, Hanoi. Historians analyzing Canada’s role reveal two views, with the dominant perspective being that of the complicity thesis. These historians argue that Canadian politicians supported US policy and were thus partners to American crimes. They emphasize that Canada “turned a blind eye to…[thousands of] Canadians illegally joining…US forces,” Canadian diplomats’ reports were sent to the US embassy before Ottawa, and Canadian representatives advised the US on how to bring the focus via unscheduled flights to abandoned land. Furthermore, the US often used Canada’s diplomatic efforts failing as an excuse to justify additional bombing. An alternative view is that Canada’s efforts were aimed at deterring nuclear war. These historians argue Canada made every “reasonable effort to facilitate serious negotiations between Hanoi and Washington.” For instance, Canada was part of the “International Commission for Supervision and Control” (ICC), a body founded in 1954 following the French-Indochinese War. Blair Seaborn, Canada’s ICC Representative, explained that alongside India and Poland, Canada was in Vietnam as an impartial observer. He argued that due to its ICC membership, Canada could not militarily support America. Pearson’s controversial Temple University Speech—a speech at an American university calling on the US to stop its Vietnam bombing—which significantly damaged US-Canada relations, also highlighted Canada’s opposition to violence in Vietnam. Letters also reveal that Pearson stated Canada “would have great reservations about nuclear bombing.” Overall, Canadian government policy constantly attempted to balance Canadian public sentiment against the war, and Canada’s obligations towards its neighbouring ally that fought the war.
Conclusion: Canada’s Paradoxical Stance (Explained)
After the Vietnam War ended, Canada closed its Saigon mission, shipping “out bag and baggage” and leaving local employees to the Communists’ mercy. Canada simultaneously engaged in humanitarian efforts as it accepted 69,000 Indochinese refugees between 1975 and 1980. This situation embodies Canada’s stance throughout the war. Canada truly “played both sides of the fence.” On one hand, Canada welcomed draft dodgers alongside refugees, hosted many protests against violence, housed anti-Americanism, was part of the ICC and facilitated many diplomatic missions between the North and South. On the other hand, Canada abandoned local employees, ignored Canadian enlistment, sustained US defences, and set the stage for US attacks. One may ask: Why did Canada have such a double-faced stance? Historians offer an answer, as they blame Canada’s paradoxical stance on the government’s need to maintain its alliance with its neighbouring nuclear power, sustain its economy, and protect its image among its citizens alongside the international community.
Siya Duggal is a fourth-year student at the University of Toronto, pursuing a double-major in International Relations and History alongside a minor in Political Science. She has completed the legal history, human rights, and international law focus streams. Siya was an Editor for Vol. XXIV of the Attaché Journal of International Affairs (2024-25), and currently serves as Co-Head of the Commentary Division (2025-2026). In her free time, Siya enjoys trying new cafés and is on a quest to visit all the UofT Libraries before graduating.
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