Matt Pindera | Originally Published: 4 April 2026
Is sibling love truly unconditional? Serbia and Russia are said to possess a special, brotherly relationship, rooted in Moscow’s condemnation of the NATO bombing campaign of Belgrade in 1999, refusal to recognize Kosovo, and the shared linguistic, cultural and spiritual traits between the two nations. For the European Commissioner for Enlargement in Brussels, Serbian-Russian kinship and the governance challenges that follow, namely distaste for democratic reforms, rule of law, and an unwillingness to align with the EU on its Common Foreign and Security Policy, remain the greatest obstacle to absorbing Serbia into the Union.
However, despite the historical links between Serbia and Russia and the narrative of Slavic friendship publicly touted by state officials from both nations, the signs of fractures between the two in recent years are unmistakable.
Beyond the red carpets and camera flashes, arguably, Russia’s primary lever of influence in Serbia is energy, with Serbia importing as much as 90% of their gas consumption from Russia via the TurkStream and BalkanStream pipelines. Additionally, since 2008, Russia’s state-owned energy company Gazprom has owned a majority stake in Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), Serbia’s leading energy company that operates the country’s only oil refinery. Recent disputes surrounding the US decision to place sanctions on NIS have caused a noticeable rift between Serbia and Russia. The dispute played out publicly, as Serbian President Aleksander Vucic stated with frustration that Russia threatened to cut off oil supplies if Belgrade moved to nationalize the refinery. In return, Serbia gave Russia a stringent one-week deadline to extend Gazprom’s contract or else they would seek new suppliers entirely, thus leveraging Serbia’s purchasing power to pressure a decision from Russia. In the end, it seems a compromise has been struck, as Hungary’s Russian-friendly energy multinational, MOL, signed a Heads of Agreement in January outlining its intention to buy Gazprom’s stake. This game of energy-deal brinkmanship might seem strange to observers who view Serbia and Russia’s relationship as unwaveringly positive.
Reuters, Marko Djurica
In 1786, the Galerie de Bois was constructed to distinguish the Palais-Royal’s courtyard from the garden, and formed the fourth edge of the quadrangular parcel. Two galleries were each lined with four rows of shops, and were notably illuminated by open windows under the roof’s overhang, enabling semi-zenithal lighting. However, the gallery was held in negative esteem; it was notoriously known by its sordid reputation as a place of prostitution.
Secondly, while Serbia remains one of only two European states, along with Belarus, to not apply US-led sanctions on Russia as a response to their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Serbia has been quietly supplying weapons to Ukraine through intermediary buyers in the EU. Russia has described the flow of Serbian weapons to Ukraine as a “stab in the back”, and that Serbs are seeking to “profit from the blood of fraternal Slavic peoples.” When asked about the dispute in November 2025, Vucic himself stated that “the buyers can do what they want with it.” Even amongst Serbia’s weapon imports, the Russian share has steadily declined since 2022, with Serbia pivoting towards both China and Israel as preferred sources of manufactured weapons.
More generally, trade and investment between Serbia and Russia have waned over the past decade. For example, in 2024, trade with Russia made up only 3% of Serbia’s total trade, while trade with the EU made up roughly 60%. Beyond trade, the EU accounted for 56% of Serbia’s foreign direct investment between 2010 and 2024. During that same period, Russia accounted for a measly 7% in comparison.
AFP, Andrej Isakovic
Looking towards public perceptions of the Serbia-Russia relationship, 2025 polling showed that 83% of Serbians still view Russia favourably, and 41% view Russia as Serbia’s main ally. Despite relatively positive views of Russia, segments of Serbia’s booming civic activist sector, amidst the nation’s ongoing student-led, anti-corruption protests, have developed a newfound distaste for Russia, as the Kremlin has vocally supported the ruling party SNS, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has declared the movement a Western attempt at staging another Colour Revolution. However, keep in mind that student groups have publicly distanced themselves from Western-funded NGOs, and you will struggle to find an EU flag in the sea of protestors.
With all of these cracks between Serbia and Russia coming to light, Ursula Von Der Leyen and Marta Kos still should not dream of a long-term geopolitical realignment. The truth is that persistent pragmatism has been the defining feature of Serbian foreign policy in the 21st century, but especially after SNS and Vucic came to power in 2012. Somehow, SNS manages to fuse pro-Russian, conservative nationalism with ultimately reformist, pro-European aspirations. Von der Leyen has regularly praised reforms initiated by Vucic, referring to him as “dear Aleksander” in 2024, despite the obvious democratic backsliding taking place under his watch. Serbia is an EU candidate country, yet it refuses to sanction Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine. Serbia, in fact, has voted to condemn the invasion at several UN assemblies. These contradictions are rampant in Serbian foreign policy, which rests on a multi-vectoral and pragmatic strategy aimed at securing its national interests from both powers on its periphery.
European Union
The fact of the matter is that sanctions on Russia would jeopardize Serbia’s uninterrupted flow of cheap energy that covers its domestic demands. Observing the collapse of EU conditionality, Vucic has hardly been punished for this position by Brussels, as Serbia nonetheless received funds last month from the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility. Truthfully, Serbia has seemingly executed a highly effective balancing dynamic between Brussels and Moscow. Serbia continues to receive EU integration funds despite showing no real promise on the Copenhagen criteria front; it also receives cheap energy from Russia and, maybe even more importantly, Moscow’s backing on the status of Kosovo in every international forum. The implicit threat of closer integration with either party allows Serbia to get what it seeks from both, while pumping pro-Russian narratives through its media regime to swell nationalist sentiments among the public.
The opportunistic relationship between Serbia and Russia is a two-way street. For the Kremlin, the Western Balkans is the most crucial region in frustrating EU enlargement and NATO missions at large, serving as the frontline of Russia’s information warfare and pursuit of great power status. Economically and militarily, Russia simply does not possess the might to engage in the Western Balkans on a competitive level with the West, so politics, media, and culture have become the currencies of power vis-à-vis Russian-Balkan relations. Prevailing anti-Western attitudes, the strength of the Orthodox Church, the sheer quantity of pro-Russian news media, and a strong network of political elites with a vested interest in the status quo make Serbia the primary foreign node of Russian hybrid strategy in the Western Balkans and Europe more broadly.
The Serbians and the Russians have both tried to downplay the fractures in their Brotherhood, but the tear in overlapping interests is, in fact, a feature of their primarily opportunistic relationship. For those in Brussels who fantasize about bringing the lynchpin of the Balkans and main pillar of Russia’s hybrid strategy into the Union, weaning Serbia off of Russia’s economy is the easy part. Uprooting the narrative of Slavic Brotherhood and Western malice – which captures the political imagination of Serbs everywhere and has defined Serbia’s international posture for decades – is a mountain to climb.
Matt Pindera is a fifth-year student, studying International Relations, European Affairs, and History. Currently, he is serving as one of the Co-Heads of Commentary for the Attaché. His topics of interest include tensions between deeper integration and sovereignty in the EU, civil society in the former Eastern bloc, and great power competition in the emerging multipolar world. Outside of studying international politics, in his free time, Matt enjoys playing football/soccer and listening to UK electronic music.
References
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