



The Attaché

Journal of International Affairs | Volume XXI Annual Issue



Dear Reader,

For the 2020-2021 Attaché Editorial Team, this final edition represents the culmination of months of dedicated effort and the realization of a bold vision distinguishing the twenty-first volume from those of past years. By expanding the journal's scope from one April edition to two smaller themed issues and a major edition released throughout the academic year, we have sought to create a more ambitious Attaché capable of holding up a mirror to the complex, shifting realities of contemporary international relations. Over the past year, the pages of our journal have featured outstanding student work weighing in on debates surrounding fundamental issues of our time, from the ethics and effectiveness of global governance institutions to intersecting geo-political and energy calculations underpinning U.S. foreign relations. This edition is no exception.

Featuring case studies and narratives cutting across time periods and regional contexts, while alternatively zeroing in on game-changing personalities and taking a step back to consider sweeping global trends, the papers in this collection do not compromise in their explorative focus. The authors have chosen intriguing and specific avenues to pen their work—small windows to vast systems—and the richness of this discourse has been whittled and shaped with precision to meet an exceptional academic standard. These works present specific case studies in the Horn of Africa, discussing the presence of colonial and peacekeeping forces and how they have shaped the region, and in Latin America, where the impact of eco-

tourism is evaluated. Other authors turn to people rather than places: influential politicians and their specific contributions, or detriments to the tumultuous landscape of foreign policy. Each contribution, unique in both its choice of discourse and delivery, is distinguished in its thematic presence in this edition. More importantly, these works encapsulate the diverse range of focus essential to international affairs, and the necessity in discussing such range without compromise or censorship.

In the past year, citizens and governments across the world have been interconnected in ways unimaginable even a year prior. These transnational networks of collaboration invite us to reflect on how states have interacted and continue to interact with each other amidst tightened borders, lockdowns, and travel restrictions. At the same time, we can look at the resurgent nationalisms and increased government control in certain states, reflecting a trend towards strongmen authoritarianism and democratic backsliding across the world. These ever-changing dynamics of the international arena highlight the importance of looking back in history and across borders to examine the ways we have been in cooperation or conflict with each other over the years. These papers in this edition of the Attaché have brilliantly engaged with events from nearly every continent to invite us to re-examine our perspectives on a variety of international relations from across the past century.

Together, these papers represent a critical inquiry into the past and present of international relations, investigating the origins and development of today's issues which will inevitably come to shape humanity's future. As the international order increasingly confronts health crises, the erosion of human rights protections, and the climate emergency, the Attaché will be there to help make sense of a complex world by disentangling and examining its historical, socio-economic, environmental, and cultural threads.

Sincerely,
Aneesh, Erica, Stephen, and Tessa
Representing The Attaché Masthead of 2020-2021



THE ATTACHÉ

The Attaché has long served as a beacon of top-notch student scholarship. The 2021 edition (Volume XXI) offers more fuel for that bright light. What follows is an impressive collection of articles drawn from undergraduate students. Each piece is unique but all are united in the rich research and analysis brought to bear on truly well-chosen theme.

A. J. Davidson considers Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's mushy, unequivocal, and ultimately politically disastrous views on the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian Forces. Kiayla Amos-Flom explores the tensions inherent in ecotourism: A source of revenue that can create enormous problems for the very land being shown off. Isabelle Ava-Pointon serves up a re-examination of President George W. Bush's 'Chicken Kiev' speech, placing Bush's controversial views on Ukraine's post-Soviet future within the broader context of geopolitical change. Anvesh Jain smashes the notion of the state as billiard ball, instead pointing to the millions of shards of id, ego, and personality that combine and interact, sometimes erratically, before emerging as national policy: In this case, Canada's membership on the International Control Commission in Vietnam. Sinan ver der Hoeven assesses, critical, the role great powers in shaping some and foreclosing domestic and international politics in the Horn of Africa.

In addition to recognizing the impressive efforts of the article authors, I also wish to acknowledge the hard work of *The Attaché*'s editorial team. While the journal is closely associated with the International Relations Program, it is, ultimately, the result of hard work and hard choices by students who retain full editorial control. The 2020-2021 editorial team has continued to live up to the high standards of the past, and to point the way for future students. The individual effort, the teamwork, the major research effort, and the diligent effort that has gone into critiquing and publishing this issue is representative of students building on their academic excellence to demonstrate impressive professional capabilities. To the editors and authors: well done; to the readers: enjoy!

Prof. Timothy Andrews Sayle
Director, International Relations Program

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MASTERED BY HIS TIMES

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER

1959-62

A. J. DAVIDSON

On January 31, 1963, a remarkable debate unfolded in the Canadian House of Commons. The issue was defence policy: Should Canada accept nuclear weapons from the United States? Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, who had been dogged by this question for over three years, gave a two-hour speech in Parliament on January 25 in which he avoided an answer at all costs. Donald Fleming, the minister of justice, wrote in his memoirs "this was without exception the most equivocal speech I had ever heard in the House of Commons. It surpassed Mackenzie King at his best."¹ In response, American officials at the State Department took an extraordinary step. Privately accusing Diefenbaker of having "beclouded the whole issue of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces with misleading references," they issued a press release on January 30 that called his statements on the subject, accurately, full of lies.² When Parliament met the next day, this was the first item to be discussed. Liberal Party leader Lester B. Pearson accused Diefenbaker of dissembling and incompetence, while Diefenbaker retorted "When are you going back [to Washington] for further instructions?" The nuclear question would quickly consume what was left of Diefenbaker's minority government. Douglas Harkness, the minister of national defence who had argued for years that Canada should accept the weapons, resigned on February 4, precipitating a vote of no-confidence. "I resigned on a matter of principle," Harkness stated in the House. "The point was reached when I considered that my honour and integrity required that I take this step."³ Diefenbaker's

Progressive Conservatives would lose the subsequent election, and the Liberals, who had governed for twenty-two years before 1957, would return to power for another sixteen.

The issue of nuclear weapons was only the most extreme example of Diefenbaker's mismanagement of Canada's international relations. Intimately involved in all aspects of foreign policy, Diefenbaker initially intended to reserve the position of secretary of state for external affairs for himself.⁴ During his years in office, Diefenbaker had notable successes in increasing Canada's exports and in promoting human rights. Overall, though, he cannot be considered an effective manager of foreign policy. During this period Canada's two most important international relationships, by far, were with the U.S. and United Kingdom. In both cases, through arrogance, indecision, and often ignorance, Diefenbaker damaged Canada's foreign relations.

A conventional view of Diefenbaker's record is provided by Denis Smith, who writes that "the office of prime minister... seemed in some essential ways beyond his ability to master."⁵ Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein agree, with Bothwell writing that Diefenbaker did not have a wide enough worldview for the changing era of the late 1950s and early 1960s, leading him to "to bungle relations" with Britain and the U.S.⁶ An opposing position is provided by the recent volume *Reassessing the Rogue Tory*, edited by Janice Cavell and Ryan M. Touhey. "Underlying structural changes were indeed largely responsible for the extraordinary tu-

¹ Donald Fleming, *So Very Near*, Vol. 2 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 583-84.

² Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to Under Secretary of State, Washington, January 29, 1963, and Department of State Press Release No. 59, Washington, January 30, 1963, in U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963: Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada*, ed. Edward C. Keefer, James E. Miller, and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 1193 & 1195-96.

³ Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 25th Parl., 1st sess., 1962-63, vol. 3: 3290 & 3377.

⁴ John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Vol. 2: Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 135.

⁵ Denis Smith, *Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker* (Toronto: MacFarlane Walter & Ross, 1995), xi-xii.

⁶ Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 176-8, and J.L. Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove: Canada and the United States," in *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 86-104.

multuousness of the Diefenbaker era," Cavell writes. "Diefenbaker has often been criticized for failing to 'master' his times, but it may well be questioned whether any Canadian politician could have done so."⁷

It is true that Diefenbaker did face unusually strong international headwinds during his time in office. Britain's imperial era was in its final stages, and the country was turning away from its overseas commitments, including with Canada, and towards trade with Europe. Cold War tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union were at their highest during this period, and after 1960, Canada faced a particularly belligerent American administration under President John F. Kennedy. However, Diefenbaker's tactlessness and procrastination would lead policy disputes over Britain's application to join the European Common Market, American concerns over Canada's trade with communist states, and the nuclear question to escalate to the point of crisis.

Relations with the British got off to a positive start under Diefenbaker, who still believed strongly in the old Empire and was dismayed by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's interest in the new European Common Market.⁸ At his first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in July 1957, Diefenbaker proposed that trade with Britain should be greatly expanded, and after returning to Ottawa, announced that 15% of Canada's imports would be "diverted" from the U.S. to the U.K.⁹ The British responded eagerly. Diefenbaker was a "man of considerable strength of character and purpose," Macmillan told Cabinet, and "a fresh appraisal" of Britain's joining the Continental free-trade area would need to be done based on Cana-

⁷ Janice Cavell, "Introduction," in *Reassessing the Rogue Tory: Canadian Foreign Relations in the Diefenbaker Era*, ed. Janice Cavell and Ryan M. Touhey (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 17.

⁸ Smith, *Rogue Tory*, 250-1.

⁹ Editors' Note and Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, July 11, 1957, in Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 24, 1957-1958, Part 1*, ed. Michael D. Stevenson (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2003), 745-8.

da's proposal for what amounted to \$625 million in potential new exports.¹⁰ Back in Ottawa, bureaucrats worked to show Diefenbaker the impracticability of the proposal. This was the 1950s, not the 1900s, after all, and the U.S. had become a far more important trading partner for Canada than the British. On August 9, the prime minister received a lengthy memo from the Department of Finance stating that achieving a diversion of 15% would require breaking the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), probably resulting in "retaliatory action from the United States," with "severe repercussion...on Canada's general economic prosperity."¹¹

However, Diefenbaker's tactlessness and procrastination would lead policy disputes over Britain's application to join the European Common Market, American concerns over Canada's trade with communist states, and the nuclear question to escalate to the point of crisis.

On September 9, visiting Ottawa, the chancellor of the exchequer proposed a free trade area between Britain and Canada to Diefenbaker, which would enable Canada to discriminate against the U.S. without violating GATT. Diefenbaker flatly replied that he "could not see what advantage there would be in it for Canada."¹² Bothwell speculates that, during a period when he had only a minority mandate in the House, Diefenbaker did not wish to anger protectionists.¹³ The British were taken aback. Diefenbaker's 15% comment was known among

¹⁰ British National Archives, *Cabinet Conclusions 1957* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957): 354 and 394, accessed March 6, 2020, from <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/cabinet-gov/cab128-post-war-conclusions.htm>.

¹¹ Memorandum from Department of Finance to the Prime Minister, Ottawa, August 9, 1957, in *DCER Vol. 24*, 762-3.

¹² Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance to Deputy Minister of Finance, Ottawa, September 9, 1957, in *DCER Vol. 24*, 776-7.

¹³ Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 140.

the British public, who generally favoured the old Commonwealth to the new Europe, and Macmillan and his ministers wondered what the reaction would be if people thought that Canada's initiative had not been taken seriously. The British Cabinet decided to leak the proposed free-trade deal to reporters on September 19, the first of several instances where the British government would use the press to their advantage while dealing with Diefenbaker.¹⁴ By the time Macmillan visited Ottawa in June 1958, British talk of increased trade with Canada had been replaced by false assurances that Canadian agricultural interests would be protected when Britain joined the Common Market.¹⁵ One thoughtless comment from the Canadian prime minister had created a year of turmoil with the British, with nothing to show for it.

Relations with the U.K. continued to worsen over apartheid in South Africa. Non-white citizens, roughly 90% of the population, were confined to the outskirts of cities, denied the right to vote, and provided with vastly inferior public services.¹⁶ Diefenbaker was known as an advocate for human rights. Among his signature domestic accomplishments were the Canadian Bill of Rights and granting the vote to Indigenous Canadians.¹⁷ Still, due to his strong feelings for the Commonwealth, the prime minister was initially reluctant to speak out about apartheid.¹⁸ The situation changed on October 5, 1960. In a narrow referendum, South Africa voted to become a republic, removing Queen

Elizabeth II as head of state.¹⁹ By custom, the approval of the other Commonwealth nations at the next Prime Ministers' Meetings, scheduled for March 1961, would be needed for South Africa to remain in the body. The British wanted to keep South Africa in. "If we have let South Africa go, what enemy or rival may not try to inherit our present position and influence?" asked Sir John P.R. Maud, the high commissioner to South Africa, in a memo to the British Commonwealth Office, concluding "We shall not persuade present Union Government to change their policies."²⁰ Australia and New Zealand, comprising along with South Africa and Canada the "white dominions" of the Commonwealth, backed Britain.²¹

Diefenbaker was conflicted. He felt strongly enough to inform the British high commissioner to Canada in November 1960 that "unless significant changes occur in the Union Government's racial policies, Canada cannot be counted on to support South Africa's admission to the Commonwealth." Macmillan was moved to send Diefenbaker—"my dear John"—a personal letter. "We all hate the racial policies of the present South African Government," Macmillan said, but called upon Diefenbaker to remember "the expending of blood and treasure from Britain that has gone to create" South Africa, the country's "rather splendid" history, and support its membership.²² In a personal memorandum of February 26, 1961, Diefenbaker wrote plainly "We cannot throw them out. I will be condemned for breaking up the Com-

¹⁴ Cabinet Conclusions 1957, 475.

¹⁵ Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet, Ottawa, June 23, 1958, in DCER Vol. 24, 1024-6.

¹⁶ Frank Hayes, "South Africa's Departure from the Commonwealth, 1960-1961," *The International History Review* 2 no. 3 (July 1980): 457-8.

¹⁷ Canadian Bill of Rights, Statutes of Canada 1960, c. 44, <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-12.3/page-1.html>; John F. Leslie, "Indigenous Suffrage," *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, March 31, 2016, accessed March 5, 2020, from <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/indigenous-suffrage>

¹⁸ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, Vol. 2, 163.

¹⁹ "S. Africa Favors Republic," *Toronto Daily Star*, October 6, 1960, accessed March 5, 2020, from <https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1428385503>

²⁰ Sir John P.R. Maud, high commissioner to South Africa, to Sir A. Cutterbuck, permanent undersecretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office, London, August 13, 1960, in Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964, Part II*, ed. Ronald Hyam and W. Roger Louis (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2000): 411.

²¹ Minutes of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings, March 13-15, 1961, in *ibid.*, 428-447.

²² Editors' Note, and Harold Macmillan to John G. Diefenbaker, London, November 18, 1960, in *ibid.*, 412-13.

monwealth."²³ The prime minister remained undecided as he headed to the conference in March.²⁴

Upon arriving in London, Diefenbaker found strong opposition towards South Africa from the non-white Commonwealth nations, particularly India. He encouraged them to take a hard line and followed a course of action first proposed by Harold C. Green, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in January.²⁵ South Africa would be invited to stay, but a joint communiqué emphasizing the Commonwealth policy against racial discrimination should also be issued. On March 13, during the first meeting of the world leaders, Diefenbaker made his case. "The racial policy of South Africa...was repugnant to the Canadian people," he said, as paraphrased by the meeting minutes:

*There was no doubt that to accept South Africa's present request would be construed as approval of, or at least acquiescence in, South Africa's racial policy. This could not but damage the future value of the Commonwealth association and assist Communist propaganda... although there might be wide divergences on many other questions, all members of the Commonwealth should subscribe to the principle of non-discrimination between human beings on grounds of race or colour.*²⁶

Over two subsequent days of meetings, the text of the statement was negotiated with Hendrik Verwoerd, prime minister of South Africa. Ultimately, Verwoerd decided that releasing a statement reading "[the racial] policies [of South Africa] were inconsistent with the basic ideals on which the unity and influence of the Commonwealth rest" was not worth the bene-

²³ Memorandum by Prime Minister, February 26, 1961, in Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 28, 1961, ed. Janice Cavell (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2009), 792 & 801.

²⁴ Cabinet Conclusions, March 2, 1961, in *ibid.*, 804.

²⁵ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs* Vol. 2, 165.

²⁶ Minutes of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings, March 13-15, 1961, in *CGEE 1957-1964 Part II*, 427.

fits of membership, and withdrew South Africa's application to join the Commonwealth as a republic.²⁷

How important was Diefenbaker in ensuring this outcome? While Norman Hillmer correctly notes the importance of the non-ethnically European countries at the negotiating table, it meant a good deal for Diefenbaker to be the only white prime minister to stand against South Africa. None other than Macmillan would later claim, "without [Diefenbaker], we could have got through."²⁸ Despite the admirable nature of Diefenbaker's statements, it is also true that his indecision had the effect of blind-siding the other Commonwealth leaders, especially Britain, contributing to the decline in relations.

For the remainder of Diefenbaker's term, the issue of Britain's application to join the Common Market, now the European Economic Community (EEC), mounted. Green estimated that it would be "simply disastrous for Canada," and despite being concerned that they did not have enough public support, Diefenbaker and his ministers opposed the British.²⁹ One notable example was the September 1961 Commonwealth economic conference in Accra, Ghana, where Canadian delegates were accused of leading other countries in "ganging up" on the British.³⁰ There was blowback from an apparently pro-British citizenry. "Canadians," reported Minister of Justice Davie Fulton to Cabinet on September 14, 1961, "blamed the government...for constantly bleating [about the EEC] instead of living with the times."³¹ Nevertheless, Diefenbaker continued to complain, including at a Commonwealth conference in London in

²⁷ High Commissioner in United Kingdom to Prime Minister, London, March 17, 1961, in DCER Vol. 28, 813.

²⁸ Norman Hillmer, "Different Leader, Different Paths," and Kevin A. Spooner, "The Diefenbaker Government and Foreign Policy in Africa," in *Reassessing the Rogue Tory: Canadian Foreign Relations in the Diefenbaker Era*, ed. Janice Cavell and Ryan M. Touhey (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 56-7 & 193.

²⁹ Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 145.

³⁰ Smith, *Rogue Tory*, 424.

³¹ Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, September 14, 1961, in DCER Vol. 28, 878.

September 1962. Given the pro-Commonwealth sentiments of the British public, Macmillan viewed this as an unacceptable intrusion on domestic politics, and his ministers began leaking damaging comments about Diefenbaker to the Canadian press. Even though French President Charles de Gaulle would veto Britain's application to join the EEC in January 1963, Diefenbaker's time in office was over before Canadian-British relations recovered.³²

With Canadian-American relations too, a promising start would end in vitriol. From the time Diefenbaker took office in June 1957 until January 1961, the American president was Dwight Eisenhower. "Dief" and "Ike" were both sons of the Prairies, and of the 19th century, and the two men got along together quite well.³³ However, the issues of trade with communist nations and disagreements on nuclear weapons began during this period and would grow into major roadblocks once a less sympathetic administration entered the White House.

Among Diefenbaker's main priorities on taking office was increasing Canadian exports, particularly agricultural products, and Canada found ready buyers in the People's Republic of China and Cuba, Second World states that were barred from the U.S. market.³⁴ One of the worst famines in history, brought on by the disastrous policies of Mao Zedong's communist government, ravaged China between 1959 and 1961. While the extent of the catastrophe was not known (and is still not fully known), Canada was only too happy to sell wheat to the People's Republic, at advantageous prices.³⁵ The Americans did not respond favourably. On October 8, 1958, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tersely informed Norman Robertson, then the ambassador to the U.S., that "a little business with Red China" should not endanger

what the Americans believed was a matter of international security.³⁶

In January 1959, Fidel Castro's rebels came to power in Cuba, toppling the pro-U.S. regime there and seizing the assets of American corporations. In October 1960, the U.S. imposed an embargo on exports to Cuba. Canadian companies, however, had been spared nationalization, and sold the goods that the Cubans could no longer buy from the U.S.³⁷ After what he called a "disturbing conversation" with Ottawa, Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson told the National Security Council (NSC) on July 15, 1960 that "the Canadians...felt that the U.S. was preoccupied with communism," and would take no action to bar Canadian commerce with Cuba.³⁸ The trade issue would remain unresolved for the duration of Eisenhower's presidency.

The second major problem to come up during the Eisenhower years was in defence policy. Diefenbaker took a fairly conventional view of the Cold War, and believed that Canada should contribute to the Western military alliance against the Soviet Union.³⁹ Almost immediately after taking office, Diefenbaker agreed to integrate Canada's air defences with the U.S., joining the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) without securing a formal agreement about how this arrangement would operate. Diefenbaker's rapid decision came with the approval of the military—who would

³⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 10, 1958, in U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960: Volume XIX, China*, ed. Harriet D. Schwar and Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 361.

³⁷ Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 156-7.

³⁸ Memorandum of Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 15, 1960, in U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960: Volume VI, Cuba*, ed. John P. Glennon and Ronald D. Landa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1018-19.

³⁹ Nicole Marion, "'I Would Rather Be Right': Diefenbaker and Canadian Disarmament Movements," in *Reassessing the Rogue Tory: Canadian Foreign Relations in the Diefenbaker Era*, ed. Janice Cavell and Ryan M. Touhey (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 145-6.

³² Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 146.

³³ Robert Bothwell, *The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 57.

³⁴ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs Vol. 2*, 137.

³⁵ Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 154.

later admit that they "stampeded" the incoming Conservatives to sign on—and Minister of National Defence George Pearkes, but the deep alarm of Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith. It was, as John Hilliker and Donald Barry write, a troubling premonition of much deeper divides that would emerge later in Diefenbaker's ministry.⁴⁰

One of the Eisenhower Administration's primary defence policy initiatives was the "New Look," an effort to save money on conventional forces through the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions," concluded the NSC on October 30, 1953.⁴¹ In 1957, the U.S. began considering giving nuclear weapons to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies under a system of joint control. Dulles told Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness and Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith in December 1957 that "NATO strategy depends" on Canada accepting nuclear weapons, and Harkness and Smith recommended this to Cabinet.⁴² In Europe, tactical nuclear weapons would be given to Canadian soldiers and airmen. In Canada, Diefenbaker decided to adopt the nuclear-armed Boeing CIM10-B "Bomarc" surface-to-air missile as a replacement for the cancelled Avro Arrow interceptor aircraft. Soviet bombers carrying nuclear weapons would have to fly over Canada in order to reach their targets in the U.S., and the Bomarc was designed to shoot up to their altitude and detonate.⁴³

⁴⁰ Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove," 89; Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs Vol. 2*, 236-7.

⁴¹ Statement of Policy by the National Security Council (NSC 162/2), Washington, October 30, 1953, in U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954: Volume II, Part 1, National Security Affairs*, ed. William Z. Slany, Lisle A. Rose, and Neal H. Petersen (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 593.

⁴² Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs (Sidney Smith) and Minister of National Defence (Douglas Harkness) to Cabinet, Ottawa, December 3, 1957, in *DCER Vol. 24*, 503-5.

⁴³ Bothwell, *The Big Chill*, 57-8.

the construction of two Bomarc bases, and on October 15, Cabinet agreed that negotiations should proceed with the Americans to get nuclear warheads for the Bomarcs.⁴⁴ On February 20, 1959, Diefenbaker announced this course of action to Parliament. "It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfill their respective roles," Diefenbaker said.⁴⁵

By November 24, 1960, however, Diefenbaker was stating that Canada would not acquire nuclear weapons "while progress towards disarmament continues."⁴⁶ The prime minister would draw out the issue of whether Canada would actually accept the arms until the end of his term. Scholars disagree on the precise origins of Diefenbaker's delay, but three factors seem particularly important, and all likely played a role: a new secretary of state for external affairs, public pressure on the prime minister, and personal conflict with the American president.

First, in June 1959, the pro-nuclear Smith died, and was replaced by Green as secretary of state for external affairs. Green came to believe strongly in the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons and the goal of disarmament, regularly bringing it up at the United Nations and other international bodies. "To turn around and take" nuclear weapons, Green would later recall, would have "just made us look foolish." Arrayed against Green was Harkness, who adamantly believed Canada should take the weapons. "The two ministers and their departments," Granatstein says, "became locked in a struggle for the soul and mind of John Diefen-

⁴⁴ Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, September 21, 1958, and Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, October 15, 1958, in Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 25, 1957-1958, Part 2, ed. Michael D. Stevenson (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2004), 208 & 232-3.

⁴⁵ Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 24th Parl., 2nd sess., 1959, vol. 2: 1223.

⁴⁶ John G. Diefenbaker, "Foundations of Canadian External Policy," in Canadian Dept. of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches 1960* (Ottawa: External Affairs Canada Bureau of Information, n.d.), document 60/41.

baker—a confused mind and a troubled soul.”⁴⁷

It was, as John Hilliker and Donald Barry write, a troubling premonition of much deeper divides that would emerge later in Diefenbaker's ministry.

Second, Diefenbaker was coming under the influence of the Canadian disarmament movement, which began a letter-writing campaign to stop the government from accepting nuclear weapons.⁴⁸ Believing, probably incorrectly, that anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiment were quite widespread in Canada, Patricia McMahon argues, Diefenbaker was not merely indecisive, but pursued a deliberate, two-handed strategy of advocating for disarmament while planning on accepting the weapons—eventually. “Diefenbaker believed,” McMahon writes, “that Canadians would be more willing to accept nuclear weapons...if they knew that their prime minister had done so only as a last resort.”⁴⁹

Third, Diefenbaker developed an intense personal grievance with the new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, who took office in January 1961. The pair seemed to get off to a good start, with Diefenbaker remarking privately that his meeting with Kennedy in February 1961 was “excellent...it could not have been better.”⁵⁰ Although Diefenbaker told Kennedy that “the Canadian Government will not decide at the present time whether or not Canadian forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons” while “efforts in the disarmament field are still in progress,” he also said that joint command and control arrangements similar to the ones the U.S. had with Britain would be satisfactory.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Granatstein, “When Push Came to Shove,” 89.

⁴⁸ Bothwell, *The Big Chill*, 60-1.

⁴⁹ Patricia I. McMahon, *Essence of Indecision: Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), x.

⁵⁰ Granatstein, “When Push Came to Shove,” 90.

⁵¹ Memorandum of Conversation of the Visit of Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Washington, February 20,

The first rocks in the Diefenbaker-Kennedy relationship came over Cuba. On April 17, 1961, rebels backed by the U.S. made a failed beach assault on Castro's regime at the Bay of Pigs. Green told American reporters that Canada would “mediate” between the U.S. and Cuba, angering the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk irritably wrote that Green “seemed to join the long parade of those who have wished to provide...continuous concessions on our part to an insatiable power determined to pursue its world revolution by every available means.”⁵² During a state visit to Ottawa in May, the prime minister's relationship with the president continued to break down. Kennedy pronounced Diefenbaker's name with a German accent (“Diefenbawker”) while addressing Parliament. During a private meeting, Diefenbaker refused to enact sanctions against Cuba, and told Kennedy that it was “politically impossible” to accept nuclear weapons, to which Kennedy “expressed perplexity.”⁵³ Kennedy publicly teased and derided Diefenbaker, including over his French language ability. At a dinner party in Ottawa at the U.S. ambassador's residence, Kennedy expressed his preference for Pearson.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, Cold War tensions continued to escalate, as Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev threatened to cut off supply lines to West Berlin, culminating with the erection of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961. Although Diefenbaker sent an additional 1,106 Canadian soldiers to Europe during the crisis, he continued to demur on the issue of nuclear weapons.⁵⁵ Kennedy wrote to Diefenbaker encouraging Canada to “renew with vigor” the negotiations over gaining access to nuclear weapons, which Harkness

⁵¹ 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIII, 1146.

⁵² Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, Geneva, May 14, 1961, in *ibid.*, 1153.

⁵³ Nash, *Kennedy and Diefenbaker*, 62; Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Ottawa, May 17, 1961, in FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIII, 1158-61.

⁵⁴ Stephen Azzi, “The Problem Child: Diefenbaker and Canada in the Language of the Kennedy Administration,” in *Reassessing the Rogue Tory: Canadian Foreign Relations in the Diefenbaker Era*, ed. Janice Cavell and Ryan M. Touhey (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 106.

⁵⁵ Marion, “I Would Rather Be Right,” 150.

did.⁵⁶ However, Cabinet remained deadlocked on whether Canada should actually accept the warheads.⁵⁷ The U.S. also pressed the issue of trade. Under-Secretary of State George Ball told the Canadian ambassador to the U.S. that Ottawa should halt the wheat trade with Beijing as a means of pressuring China to stop supporting North Vietnam.⁵⁸

In April 1962, Kennedy hosted a dinner at the White House for North American Nobel Prize laureates—including Pearson, who proudly informed the press that he had spoken privately with the president for forty minutes about international affairs. Diefenbaker was infuriated.⁵⁹ Earlier, during Kennedy's visit to Ottawa, Diefenbaker had found and kept a White House memorandum reminding Deputy National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow of issues to “push” Canada on.⁶⁰ Brandishing the document, Diefenbaker called up Livingston Merchant, the U.S. ambassador to Canada, on May 5. “He launched into what can be only described as a tirade” lasting two hours, Merchant reported to the State Department. “The exchanges...became heated.” Diefenbaker, Merchant said, regarded Kennedy's spending time with Pearson as an “intervention” in Canadian politics that would “blow our relations sky high.” Diefenbaker threatened to use Rostow's memo “to demonstrate that he, himself, was the only leader capable of preventing United States domination of Canada.” It was an “extraordinary disquisition,” Merchant said. “He was excited to a degree disturbing in a leader of an important country.”⁶¹ Ultimately, Diefen-

⁵⁶ Telegram from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Washington, August 3, 1961, in FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIII, 1163.

⁵⁷ Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, August 23, 1961, and Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, August 25, 1961, in DCER Vol. 28, 602-610.

⁵⁸ Memorandum for Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Washington, January 13, 1962, in Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 29, 1962-3, ed. Janice Cavell (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2013), 1021-2.

⁵⁹ Nash, *Kennedy and Diefenbaker*, 160-2.

⁶⁰ Granatstein, “When Push Came to Shove,” 93.

⁶¹ Letter from the Ambassador to Canada (Merchant) to Act-

baker never tried to use the memo.

Believing, probably incorrectly, that anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiment were quite widespread in Canada, Patricia McMahon argues, Diefenbaker was not merely indecisive, but pursued a deliberate, two-handed strategy of advocating for disarmament while planning on accepting the weapons—eventually.

In the elections of June 18, 1962, Diefenbaker lost his majority in Parliament. The already precarious balance in Cabinet became even more delicate, because if any minister were to resign, it would threaten the government's survival. Quickly, another crisis emerged in Cuba.⁶² On October 14, an American U-2 spy plane took pictures clearly showing that the Soviets were constructing medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missile launch sites on Cuba, just ninety miles off the coast of Florida. On October 22, Kennedy announced on television and radio, also broadcast in Canada, that the U.S. would impose a naval “quarantine” around Cuba. While Canadian intelligence was largely aware of what the U.S. had discovered, Ottawa was not consulted about the way forward, despite the fact that any war between the U.S. and Soviet Union would inevitably have grave consequences for Canada. Diefenbaker was summarily informed of the planned quarantine only two hours before Kennedy's address.⁶³

In response, Diefenbaker took steps that incensed the U.S. During an evening session of

Secretary of State Ball, Ottawa, May 5, 1962, in FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XIII, 1172-7.

⁶² U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, “The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962,” *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, n.d., accessed March 10, 2020, from <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis>

⁶³ Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, Ottawa, October 22, 1962, and Special Emissary of President of the United States to Prime Minister, Ottawa, October 22, 1962, in DCER Vol. 29, 1132-4.

Parliament on October 22 immediately following Kennedy's announcement, an atmosphere described by one member of Parliament as being "nervous as expectant fathers outside the maternity ward," Diefenbaker called for the U.N. to investigate what was going on in Cuba, a suggestion interpreted by the U.S. as evidence that the Canadians did not believe them.⁶⁴ Diefenbaker also declined to accept Harkness' recommendation that Canadian forces be raised to the same level of alert, Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) 3, as their American counterparts for two days, stating in Cabinet that the British response to the Cuban crisis had to be determined. On October 24, only after the U.S. had reached DEFCON 2, meaning that war was imminent, Diefenbaker authorize the alert. Unbeknownst to him, Harkness had already done so.⁶⁵

On October 30, an apparent resolution to the nuclear impasse was reached. Cabinet agreed, following a proposal of Green's, that an agreement should be negotiated where the nuclear weapons would be stored in the U.S. and rapidly deployed to arm the Bomarcs "on request by the Canadian Government when war appears imminent."⁶⁶ However, following a meeting in Paris between Harkness, Green, Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on December 14, 1962, McNamara called Harkness to inform him that the "missing part" idea was considered unacceptable by the U.S. Harkness did not inform the DEA of this development until January 25, 1963, resulting in additional miscommunication and confusion.⁶⁷

By this point, Diefenbaker's government was

⁶⁴ Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 25th Parl., 1st sess., 1962-63, vol. 1: 805-6; Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove," 97.

⁶⁵ Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, October 23, 1962, and Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, October 24, 1962, in DCER Vol. 29, 1139-42 & 1157-61; Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 167-9.

⁶⁶ Cabinet Conclusions, Ottawa, October 30, 1962, in DCER Vol. 29, 391-2.

⁶⁷ Editor's Note and Memorandum by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, January 19, 1963, in *ibid.*, 405.

"in extremis," according to Granatstein.⁶⁸ On January 3, 1963, the retiring Canadian commander of NATO forces in Europe, Gen. Lauris Norstad, told the press that Canada's "obligations" included the adoption of nuclear weapons.⁶⁹ This prompted Pearson to take a position on the nuclear question in a speech on January 12. Although he promised to press for disarmament, Pearson said that Canada had to accept nuclear weapons to fulfil its commitments to NATO.⁷⁰ This announcement relieved whatever anti-nuclear political pressure Diefenbaker was facing, but he reasoned that the Conservatives would now have to oppose the Liberals, using anti-Americanism.⁷¹ On January 25, Diefenbaker gave his infamously disjointed speech in Parliament. Diefenbaker claimed that at a recent conference with Kennedy and Macmillan at Nassau, it was decided that the Bomarc would be replaced by new defensive systems, and that the U.S. now wanted NATO countries to build up their conventional weapons. Diefenbaker also claimed that Canadian access to nuclear weapons on-demand had been secured. These were lies. "We shall at all times," Diefenbaker said vaporously, "carry out whatever our responsibilities are...this is no time for hardened decisions that cannot be altered."⁷² For the U.S., it was too much. State Department bureaucrats drafted a press release meant to "inspire respect" from Canada. "The Canadian Government," the release read, "has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense." "The agreements made in Nassau," it continued, "raise no question of the appropriateness of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces...conventional forces are not an alternative to...nuclear-capable weap-

⁶⁸ Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove," 95.

⁶⁹ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs* Vol. 2, 244.

⁷⁰ Robert Fulford, "The puzzling—to almost everybody—personality of Lester B. Pearson," *Maclean's*, April 6, 1963, accessed March 10, 2020, from <https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1963/4/6/the-puzzling-to-almost-everybody-personality-of-lester-b-pears>

⁷¹ Smith, *Rogue Tory*, 469.

⁷² Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 25th Parl., 1st sess., 1962-63, vol. 3, 3125-33.

ons systems."⁷³ They called Diefenbaker, in so many words, a liar. Based on interviews with State Department officials, Bothwell concludes that the release was drafted below Kennedy's level, but that the president certainly approved of its contents.⁷⁴ While Diefenbaker's government was by this time a "dry husk," in Granatstein's words, the effect of the American statement was decisive.⁷⁵ On February 4, following Harkness' resignation, the Liberals passed a motion of no-confidence through the House of Commons, and would win a minority mandate. The Diefenbaker years were over.

It is true that the instability of the era in which Diefenbaker governed was not his responsibility alone, and that his policies were less of a departure from the Liberal administration that preceded him than reputation may suggest. Diefenbaker's participation in international institutions such as the Commonwealth, and emphasis on human rights foreign policy, are cut from the same cloth as Louis St. Laurent's Gray Lecture of 1947.⁷⁶ Diefenbaker's overall effect on the history of Canadian foreign policy is therefore given to overstatement. The most important change to happen during his years in office, the final decline of British influence in Canada, had much more to do with decades of decolonization than it did with Diefenbaker. As Bothwell writes, "It is tempting to suggest that Anglo-Canadian relations never recovered from John Diefenbaker. It would be truer to say that they never recovered from the period 1957-1963."⁷⁷ In the area of personal relationships, Diefenbaker is also not entirely at fault. He had the misfortune of dealing with a British

⁷³ Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Under Secretary of State (Ball), Washington, January 29, 1963, and Department of State Press Release No. 59, Washington, January 30, 1963, in *FRUS 1961-63 Vol. XIII*, 1194-6.

⁷⁴ Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 177.

⁷⁵ Granatstein, "When the Department of External Affairs Mattered," 77.

⁷⁶ Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs," in Canadian Dept. of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches 1947* (Ottawa: External Affairs Canada Bureau of Information, n.d.), doc. 47/2.

⁷⁷ Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 147.

government, under Macmillan, that responded to criticism with lies and public attacks. After January 1961, Diefenbaker also had to contend with a gung-ho U.S. administration which too often expected that its demands of allies be followed with unquestioned loyalty.

However, public officials must be judged not merely on the cards they are dealt, but how well they play them. With both the British and Americans, Diefenbaker allowed problems to escalate for years until they became irreconcilable crises. The clearest example of this is on the issue of nuclear weapons, but other cases include the South Africa file and trade with communist states. Similarly, Diefenbaker allowed policy disputes and bad manners to become vicious personal feuds. Calling up the ambassador of Canada's most important ally in a rage is a perfect illustration of how the prime minister's defects of personality led to dramatic actions that proved impossible to walk back. Finally, Diefenbaker frequently ignored facts and expertise when it suited him. He did not think to consult an economist before pledging to "divert" billions of dollars of trade, for example, and openly lied to the House of Commons about Canada's defence talks with the U.S. In conclusion, John Diefenbaker cannot be considered an effective manager of Canadian foreign policy.

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THE FAILURES OF SUSTAINABLE TOURISM IN LATIN AMERICA: INEQUALITY IN ECUADORIAN AND PERUVIAN ECOTOURISM

KIAYLA AMOS-FLOM

Tourism, for better or for worse, is a pillar of the worldwide economy and a prominent source of revenue for many countries. When tourism is engaged with conversations on ethical and sustainable development, perhaps the first subsection of the industry to come to mind is ecotourism. This branch has been famously defined as involving travel to "relatively undisturbed natural areas" with the goal of admiring wild scenery, floral,

and fauna alongside applicable local cultural traditions.¹ As this division of tourism is intrinsically tied to the conservation of natural resources, actors of global governance have posited ecotourism as a key practice of

¹ Veronica Davidov, *Ecotourism and Cultural Production: An Anthropology of Indigenous Spaces in Ecuador* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), <https://books-scholarsportal-info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/en/read?id=/ebooks/ebooks3/palgrave/2014-10-02/1/9781137355386#page=211>, 46.

sustainable development as it seems a way to address two issues simultaneously: environmental degradation and continued world poverty. However, across the world and in Latin America in particular, ecotourism has not proved to be a cure-all, and instead, perpetuates pre-existing structural inequalities in the region. With case studies amongst the Kichwa, Quechua, and Cofan people of Ecuador and Peru, the theoretical discussion on the merits of inequality and sustainability become clear.² Thus, I argue that while ecotourism in Latin America may be advertised as a facet of "sustainable tourism," until the industry resolves its problems with equity, ecotourism cannot truly be called a sustainable form of development. Following an explanation of key terms and history, this paper will address key problematic facets of ecotourism, such as the imposition of Western environmentalism and exacerbation of indigenous exoticism, before concluding with possible routes for progress.

Primarily, a few definitions need to be clarified. Sustainable tourism, and sustainable development as a whole, have been defined differently by many involved parties. In this context, "sustainable," for either term, typically refers to a practice that may continue indefinitely into the future given knowledge of current material scarcity. For development, this means, for instance, taking into account that prolonged use of nonrenewable natural resources is unsustainable when devising methods to aid impoverished communities. The most current sustainable development plan in global governance lies with the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This plan acknowledges that in order to truly alleviate poverty, an intersectional approach is

² While the terms "Kichwa" and "Quechua" are used interchangeably in some literature, here they are used to differentiate the case study communities in their respective countries.

needed that incorporates "strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth – all while tackling climate change and working to preserve our oceans and forests."³ As the leader of global development, all non-state actors take their cues from the UN, and this cross-sectional understanding of sustainable development is no outlier.

However, across the world and in Latin America in particular, ecotourism has not proved to be a cure-all, and instead, perpetuates pre-existing structural inequalities in the region.

From this concept and the discussion surrounding it rises the notion of "sustainable tourism," which is harder to define, namely due to conflicting interests and how recently the debate began. In the early 1990s, the UN's World Trade Organization (UNWTO) began utilizing a "three-pillar (environmental, socio-cultural and economic) concept of sustainable tourism" that was largely a product of the debate surrounding the SDGs; however, industry expert Edward Inskeep defined an additional two pillars (visitor satisfaction and global justice and equity).⁴ Thus, from its inception, the notion of "sustainable" within sustainable tourism referred to kinds of tourism that could be maintained given factors of culture and equity as well as the economy. However, as the literature on the subject continued to evolve, a separate idea of "sustainable tourism" as opposed to "sustainable development in the context of tourism" arose with the former "aimed at sustaining the

³ United Nations. "Sustainable Development Goals." UN Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform. Accessed April 19, 2020. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>.

⁴ Tanja Mihalic, "Sustainable-Responsible Tourism Discourse – Towards 'Responsable' Tourism," *Journal of Cleaner Production* 111 (January 2016): 461–70, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.12.062>, 461.

tourism industry" and the latter "geared to meeting the 'greater good' or human needs through tourism."⁵ Even in sustainable tourism, sustaining the tourism industry includes, at least, the three-pillar concept that the UNWTO agreed upon in the 1990s. Since leading forces now agree that the strictly economic definition is outdated, as can be seen in the 2030 SDG Agenda, equality becomes an essential part of determining sustainability, both in terms of sustainable development and the tourism that claims to be a part of it.

Herein lies the question of ecotourism, as its ties to environmentally-friendly practices make it very appealing to those with stakes in sustainable development. In fact, the industry-standard definition of ecotourism arose during the same time as sustainable tourism in 1991. Hector Ceballos-Lascurain, a well-known Mexican travel consultant and conservationist, created this definition of ecotourism, which reads as follows: "tourism that involves traveling to relatively undisturbed natural areas with the specific object of studying, admiring and enjoying the scenery and its wild plants and animals, as well as any existing cultural aspects (both past and present) found in these areas."⁶ As the industry of ecotourism has grown, other stakeholders and academics have argued on changes to the meaning of the word, but the core concept of Ceballos-Lascurain's definition remains faithful. Considering the inclusion of culture into the environmental focus of ecotourism, equality amongst participants and vendors of ecotourism becomes much more crucial to the sustainability (as in literal longevity) of the

actual industry, as well as its qualification as a form of sustainable development.

Yet this sought-after equality is sorely lacking, as is evident in the imposition of Western forms of environmentalism into ecotourism. Environmentalist movements in the Global North have a long history of promoting conservation of all-natural resources, but especially wilderness. This belief forms the ideological core of ecotourism, in that the preservation of the "natural" form of the environment and the people who live in it is the key draw of the activity. But conservation is often much less complementary to the already existing environmental practices of indigenous people in the areas where ecotourism companies operate than first imagined. For example, a case study on a Kichwa community in Ecuador found that the Western conceptualization of nature as "wilderness" is extremely different from the way many indigenous groups understand the idea of nature. This is a rather large issue considering they "are now being conscripted to participate in the projects of conserving that nature."⁷ Various indigenous groups across Latin America hold relationships with the nature around them that is incompatible with the notion of leaving it untouched. The most famous of these relationships is *sumak kawsay*, or the idea of living in harmony with and granting rights to nature itself—which has been theoretically added to the Ecuadorian constitution but implemented to varying degrees. Engaging and respecting the rights of nature still involves engaging with nature, and this is overlooked at the foundational level of ecotourism.

In practice, the assumptions inherent within ecotourism from Western environmentalism often manifest as blatant dismissal of indigenous land rights. Experts on the topic have deemed

⁵ Freya Higgins-Desbiolles, "The Elusiveness of Sustainability in Tourism: The Culture-Ideology of Consumerism and Its Implications," *Tourism and Hospitality Research* 10, no. 2 (April 2010): 116–29, <https://doi.org/doi:10.1057/thr.2009.31>, 117.

⁶ Davidov, *Ecotourism and Cultural Production: An Anthropology of Indigenous Spaces in Ecuador*, 117. Paraphrased in introduction but restated in direct quotation here for clarification purposes.

⁷ Davidov, *Ecotourism and Cultural Production: An Anthropology of Indigenous Spaces in Ecuador*, 49.

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ecotourism as "arguably the greatest force currently alienating indigenous peoples from their traditional territories."⁸ Governments routinely place statuses upon undeveloped areas that seemingly protect them for sustainable ecotourist practices but simultaneously remove indigenous inhabitants from their claim. Perhaps the best example of this is Machu Picchu in Peru. Not only has the ecotourism industry at this sacred Quechua site ironically created cultural and environmental degradation through the infrastructure created to transport tourists to the site (such as a proposed cable car), but the Quechua people of the area themselves are "barred by racism and the U.S. \$10 entrance fee from visiting their own sacred site, while enduring deplorable working conditions servicing the multi-million dollar Machu Picchu industry."⁹ While all these practices have an intended purpose to bring a sustainable development program to the region, there is nothing equitable about the violation of sacred sites. Additionally, the rural and often indigenous residents whose land rights were ignored with the government's declaration of the site as a protected area are now "unfairly blamed...for conservation problems in the sanctuary."¹⁰ The case of Machu Picchu is, thus, directly connected to the flawed

⁸ Alison Johnston, "Indigenous Peoples and Ecotourism: Bringing Indigenous Knowledge and Rights into the Sustainability Equation," *Tourism Recreation Research* 25, no. 2 (January 2000): 89–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02508281.2000.11014914>, 92.

⁹ Johnston, "Indigenous Peoples and Ecotourism," 95.

¹⁰ Pellegrino A. Luciano, "Where Are the Edges of a Protected Area? Political Dispossession in Machu Picchu, Peru," *Conservation and Society* 9, no. 1 (2011), 37.

implications of Western environmentalist policy because conservation actions in the area denied indigenous land rights.

Yet this sought-after equality is sorely lacking, as is evident in the imposition of Western forms of environmentalism into ecotourism.

Moreover, even if ecotourism stakeholders do attempt to conceptualize the indigenous practice of land stewardship, they fail to recognize other indigenous land rights. On the other side of the spectrum from complete ignorance of indigenous environmental practices is their reification, which still stems from the imposition of Western environmentalist practices. While in some cases it is certainly true that indigenous groups have maintained more environmentally-friendly practices than their non-indigenous peers in the region, it is well noted that "the presumption that indigenous groups are inherently environmentalist is flawed."¹¹ Various indigenous groups have over-utilized their natural resources, as is the given right of any group towards their own land. An assumption of perfect environmentalist behavior on the part of indigenous groups is decidedly unequal treatment, and only creates more of an "othering" effect.

This reification is a facet of the larger issue of indigenous exoticism that arises as a conse-

¹¹ Jessica Coria and Enrique Calfucura, "Ecotourism and the Development of Indigenous Communities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," *Ecological Economics* 73 (January 15, 2012): 47–55,

quence of ecotourism, further devaluing its equity and sustainability. The very elements that are a huge draw for ecotourists in this faction of the industry—the wild, the authentic, and the exotic—are advertised by companies to not only be in the natural scenery viewed during trips but also in the indigenous communities living amongst the scenery. The ideal of the “noble savage” is alive and well in ecotourism, which is, itself, an evolution of the remnants of racial discourse under colonialism. Ecotourist literature in Latin America frequently presents “wild” indigenous peoples as existing in static, ‘primitive’ cultures, outside technologies, social relationships and systems characteristic of ‘modernity.’¹² If it were not inequitable enough to blatantly misrepresent the lives of indigenous peoples, imagining a so-called primitive state of being as “authentic” reinforces the same systematic structural inequities of the imperial era. In such a manner, the exoticism in the portrayal of indigenous peoples through ecotourism fulfills a paradox that paints them as simultaneously pure and simple.

Perhaps the most quintessential example of this exotification lies in the experiences of the ecotourism industry’s engagement with the lowland Kichwa of Ecuador. While the issues of this kind of portrayal arise with any form of tourism that involves cultural reproduction, the experiences of the lowland Kichwa exhibit why exoticism is particularly pronounced in ecotourism. Essentially, the Kichwa and its culture is presented in the industry as an “organic component of the ecosystem.”¹³ There is no separation of the two for tourists visiting the Ecuadorian Amazon, as the demand for “authenticity” has allowed corporations to promote stylized depictions of the Kichwa living as a permanent, undifferentiated aspect of their environment. It is fairly common

to see Ecuadorian ecotourism agencies offer “equal parts of toucan-watching and partaking in shamanic healing rituals, jungle tours, and a crash course in indigenous histories with the oil companies.”¹⁴ Indigenous culture, thus, becomes an object to be consumed, even if it is an over-stylized utopic version of it. The inequality between the tourists, who are represented as complex beings capable of multiple dimensions, and the Kichwa, who are forever delegated to an “exotic” and “primitive” facade could not be more evident. There is, accordingly, no evidence for this particular case study that indicates any sustainability in the Ecuadorian ecotourism industry.

While all these practices have an intended purpose to bring a sustainable development program to the region, there is nothing equitable about the violation of sacred sites.

Nonetheless, there are some notable exceptions to be made that suggest a possibility to change ecotourism into something that could resemble a sustainable form of development based on reducing inequitable treatment. As one might expect, these suggestions or examples tend to center around recommendations of increased indigenous leadership, participation, and gained value from the inception of an ecotourism project until its termination. Some proposed guidelines for the industry include mandatory prior informed consent, central role for indigenous conservation expertise, readiness to negotiate that includes equivalent information capacity, and respect for customary law.¹⁵ The last quality has already been implemented by various indigenous organizations worldwide to guide the building of protective economic instruments. If governments and corporations could be held accountable towards the disso-

¹² Davidov, *Ecotourism and Cultural Production: An Anthropology of Indigenous Spaces in Ecuador*, 24.

¹³ Davidov, *Ecotourism and Cultural Production: An Anthropology of Indigenous Spaces in Ecuador*, 48.

¹⁴ Davidov, *Ecotourism and Cultural Production: An Anthropology of Indigenous Spaces in Ecuador*, 5.

¹⁵ Johnston, “Indigenous Peoples and Ecotourism,” 96.

lution of forced Western environmentalism and exoticism, perhaps a demand for support in the mentioned areas would work to make at least one aspect of ecotourism truly sustainable.

In addition, there is existing evidence in Latin America for the potential to work towards a more sustainable ecotourism. It has already been noted globally that ecotourism can have a “positive effect on land value and capital formation” and that “it has helped indigenous communities to enhance participation in the management of common property land.”¹⁶ Ignorance of land rights might be more common, but there are cases when the basic economic boost associated with any large industry can empower indigenous communities. One example lies with the Cofan indigenous communities in Ecuador, which have self-described their ecotourism project as successful not only because of its entirely community-run management, but also because it is “based exclusively on the supply of the natural environment to the visitors rather than on a mixed supply of natural environment and cultural and indigenous heritage and traditions.”¹⁷ Focusing on just the environment, with an inherent understanding of indigenous conservation knowledge due to its indigenous management, does remove the two main aspects of inequality discussed in this paper from the equation. There are no cultural demonstrations to exotify nor any direct imposition of Western ideas of conservation (aside from those absorbed through other facets of life, such as media or education). It may not be perfect, but it is possible.

The ideal of the “noble savage” is alive and well in ecotourism which is itself an evolution of the remnants of racial discourse under colonialism.

¹⁶ Coria and Calfucura, “Ecotourism and the Development of Indigenous Communities,” 54.

¹⁷ Coria and Calfucura, “Ecotourism and the Development of Indigenous Communities,” 5.

As it stands currently, ecotourism’s description as a form of sustainable development or sustainable tourism is a misnomer. Industry and government standards currently include ideals of equality amongst all parties in their definition of sustainable, and have included such since their beginning. Yet evidence from various indigenous communities, including the lowland Kichwa of Ecuador and the Quechua of Machu Picchu in Peru, suggest that the establishment of Western conservation ideas and the ensuing exoticism of indigenous peoples that arises from the current model of ecotourism render the industry inherently inequitable. Without measures taken to increase equality, which have also been proven to succeed in bettering conditions like in the case of the Cofan, the industry cannot truly be considered sustainable. As a final note, it is worth adding that ecotourism’s exacerbation of structural inequalities is not limited to the experiences of indigenous communities, and other minorities (especially African-descended laborers) have faced discrimination.¹⁸ However, indigenous communities have been disproportionately and gravely affected by the inequalities of the industry. Nevertheless, advocates for sustainable tourism continue to evolve practices of ecotourism with hope for the future.

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¹⁸ If interested please see: Melanie A. Medeiros and Tiffany Henriksen, “Race and Employment Practices in Northeast Brazil’s Ecotourism Industry: An Analysis of Cultural Capital, Symbolic Capital, and Symbolic Power,” *Latin American Research Review* 54, no. 2 (June 25, 2019): 366–380, <https://doi.org/10.2522/larr.573>.



REHEATING THE CHICKEN KIEV: A REASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S INFAMOUS SPEECH

ISABELLE AVA-POINTON

At first glance, it seems inconceivable that a President of the United States of America would not support the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Yet, in his notorious 1991 speech, President George H. W. Bush did just that by calling on Ukrainians to remain in the USSR.¹ This speech, and the policy it exposed, shocked and infuriated many in Ukraine, the US, and around the world. As political scientist Susan Fink asserts, since "U.S. Cold War Soviet policy was made by the President and a few of his closest advisors,"² we must look to President Bush himself to understand this policy. I argue that Bush's primary motivation was his desire to maintain a stable bipolar world order, in addition to the secondary factors of his underestimation of the negative domestic impact on himself, relationship with President Gorbachev, and misunderstanding of the situation in the USSR.

Part One of this paper provides a literature review of the history of Ukraine's secession from the USSR, while Part Two places the Chicken Kiev speech in its historical context. Part Three examines the text and circumstances of the speech itself, as well as its immediate and long-term consequences. Finally, Part Four examines President Bush's reasoning behind making this speech.

While there is much speculation and writing on the fall of the USSR, there is less robust historiography on the Ukrainian case. This is partly due to the fact that these events are relatively recent history, so most of the major actors in this drama are still alive, and many

¹ "President Bush's Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in Kyiv, Soviet Union" cited in Appendix B of Susan D. Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev' to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Ukraine." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21, no. 1/2 (June 1997): 47. [JSTOR]

² Susan D. Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev' to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Ukraine." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21, no. 1/2 (June 1997): 12. [JSTOR]

records remain classified.

This paper uses a combination of primary and secondary sources to examine the events leading up to the "Chicken Kiev" speech, its aftermath, and the reasoning behind President Bush's policy. The secondary sources that I use include more recent opinion pieces about the speech and scholarly books and articles about the fall of the USSR and the US role therein. Three scholarly works referenced extensively in this paper are Susan Fink's article about the domestic factors in US policy towards Ukraine, political scientist Siobhan McEvoy-Levy's recent book on American exceptionalism at the end of the Cold War, and a book on summits, meetings and phone calls between US and Soviet leaders co-authored by political scientist Svetlana Savranskaya and National Security Archives Director Thomas Blanton. Fink's article is detailed and thorough, providing invaluable insight for this paper, even though it was published only six years after the events in question. McEvoy-Levy's work focuses on the performative aspects of contemporary US public diplomacy while Savranskaya and Blanton's book closely examines the US-Soviet relationship at the end of the Cold War and includes valuable transcripts of high-level conversations.

In addition to these secondary sources, I also use primary sources from government officials and the press. One of my key sources is the text of the speech itself, which I analyze closely to understand Bush's rhetoric. Other government documents include transcripts of conversations between US and Soviet officials (including Bush, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze), and US diplomatic cables made available through WikiLeaks. These provide a glimpse into the secret behind-the-scenes conversations that shaped US foreign policy. Finally, I use newspaper articles to gauge press and public reactions to the speech.

Part Two: Historical context

Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the USSR in March 1985 and immediately began a series of far-reaching reforms in the economically floundering empire.³ Western leaders particularly praised his policies of glasnost and perestroika, which they saw as leading the Soviet Union toward democracy. Gorbachev ushered in a new era of communication, détente and cooperation with the West, first with Ronald Reagan, and then with George Bush. By 1991, the two superpowers had negotiated the landmark Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).⁴

Within the USSR, Gorbachev faced economic collapse and secessionist republics. In response to calls for independence, Gorbachev proposed a new Union treaty in November 1990.⁵ He tried to convince the Republics to sign on by emphasizing the new powers they would receive, including the right to determine their own economic system. However, American journalist David Remnick observed at the time that the new treaty still allowed Moscow to "control the state's military and security organs, formulate foreign policy, organize the financial and credit systems and control gold, energy reserves and other resources it deems necessary" systems.⁶ Ukraine's initial reaction to the proposed Union Treaty was not positive, as its leadership insisted they would finish their new constitution before considering the treaty.⁷ Alongside his coaxing, Gorbachev did not shy away from violence and threats, crush-

ing Baltic unrest in January 1991.⁸ The Soviet leadership was also splintering, as Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin's "strained personal relations"⁹ became a factor in the Union Treaty negotiations.¹⁰ At one point, Gorbachev threatened Yeltsin with a "political struggle" if he did not cooperate.¹¹ Finally, in March 1991, nine of the Soviet Republics held a referendum on the Union Treaty, with a turnout of over 80% and results of 77% approval.¹² Even in Ukraine, support was high with an 83% turnout and 71% vote of approval.¹³

He even claimed that choosing between "supporting President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders throughout the U.S.S.R." is a "false choice."

External affairs were also connected to the USSR's decline. Soviet influence abroad was waning, as the Berlin Wall had fallen in 1989, and the Warsaw Pact dissolved on July 1, 1991.¹⁴ Meanwhile, another multiethnic Communist state, Yugoslavia, was disintegrating into a bloody war. Simmering tensions and minor clashes throughout the spring and summer of 1991 boiled over when Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence on June 25, triggering the relatively bloodless Ten-Day War in Slovenia and the much longer and bloodier war in Croatia.¹⁵ In the Middle East, by March 1991, the US was winding down "Operation Desert Storm," the First Persian Gulf War against Iraq. The strength of

³ Svetlana Savranakaya, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016) xxix. [EBSCO]

⁴ Savranakaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 802-803. These negotiations began under Reagan and continued under Bush until July 1991, when they were finally signed in Moscow. (Savranakaya and Blanton, 802, 811.)

⁵ David Remnick, "Gorbachev Unveils his New Union Treaty." *Washington Post*, November 24, 1990.

⁶ Remnick, "Gorbachev," *Washington Post*, 1990.

⁷ Remnick, n. pag..

US-Soviet cooperation was such that the Soviets had joined the coalition against Saddam Hussein. Indeed, to the Bush administration, "the Gulf War was the paradigm which proved the benefits of Soviet compliance for the furtherance of American interests."¹⁶ Thus, in summer 1991, relations between the US and Soviet Union were strong, but separatism was rising within the USSR and the wider Communist world was crumbling.

Part Three: The Speech and its Aftermath

President Bush presented a speech to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of the Ukrainian SSR in Kyiv, Ukraine on August 1st, 1991.¹⁷ Its text was written by Condoleezza Rice, with input from both Bush and Gorbachev.¹⁸ In what Savranakaya and Blanton claim "was arguably one of the president's best speeches,"¹⁹ Bush argued that "freedom is not the same as independence" and insisted that Americans "will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism."²⁰ He even claimed that choosing between "supporting President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders throughout the U.S.S.R." is a "false choice."²¹ These comments were clearly unsupportive of Ukrainian independence. To add insult to injury, Bush consistently referred to Ukrainians as "Soviet peoples" and Ukraine as a "Soviet Republic."²² Political scientist Robert Hutchings argues that Bush's speech aimed "to promote the ongoing negotiations between Gorbachev and republic leaders toward the

¹⁶ Siobhán McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001) 101.

¹⁷ Throughout this essay I will be using the preferred transliteration "Kyiv" to refer to the capital of Ukraine, but I will keep the spelling "Kiev" when it appears in quotations.

¹⁸ Monck, Adrian and Mike Hanley. "The Secrets of Chicken Kiev." *New Statesman*, Dec 6, 2004, 31. [ABI/INFORM Collection]; McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism*, 100; Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev,'" 17.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "President Bush's Remarks," 48.

²¹ Ibid. 47.

²² McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism*, 100.

new Union Treaty."²³ This message was heard loud and clear but not well received.

The speech was, as McEvoy-Levy understates, "controversial" in Ukraine, the wider USSR, and the US.²⁴ In Ukraine, independence-minded citizens were greatly displeased with the speech.²⁵ Disappointed though they were, most Ukrainian parliamentarians were not surprised, as several Ukrainian-Americans had forewarned them.²⁶ The speech also had major consequences for the USSR as a whole. In fact, some scholars have argued that the Chicken Kiev speech encouraged plotters to go ahead with the coup against Gorbachev on 19 August.²⁷ By August 21, it was clear that the coup had failed, but it was equally clear that it had shaken the Soviet Union. On August 24, despite Bush's exhortations, the Ukrainian SSR declared independence, citing the coup as a catalyst, and set a referendum on independence for December 1st, 1991.²⁸

Furthermore, Bush received enormous pushback from the American press, who "vilified" his speech.²⁹ In a late August New York Times piece, columnist William Safire introduced the name "Chicken Kiev speech," which quickly caught on.³⁰ Safire further lambasted Bush for "foolishly placing Washington on the side of Moscow centralism and against the tide of history."³¹ Even in Congress, the reaction was swift and brutal as, on August 2nd, a Democratic Senator condemned the President's speech.³² This public, press and parliamentary pushback prompted Bush's National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft to pen an article

²³ Savranakaya and Blanton, 812.

²⁴ Ibid. 101.

²⁵ Savranakaya and Blanton, 812.

²⁶ Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev,'" 18.

²⁷ Fink, 18.

²⁸ "Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution On Declaration of Independence of Ukraine." Kyiv, Ukraine. August 24, 1991.

²⁹ McEvoy-Levy, 101.

³⁰ McEvoy-Levy, 101.

³¹ William Safire, "After the Fall," *New York Times*, August 29, 1991.

³² Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev,'" 19.

President Bush's speech exhorting Ukrainians to stay in the USSR was motivated by domestic, personal, and geostrategic interests.

for the New York Times clarifying the administration's policy.³³ On November 22, Congress passed a bipartisan bill calling on Bush to recognize Ukrainian sovereignty and send aid to the new country.³⁴ Bush finally met with Ukrainian-American lobbyists on November 27th and promised them that he would recognize Ukraine.³⁵

On December 1st, over 90% of Ukrainians voted for independence.³⁶ Ukraine was also the first major domino to fall among the Republics, with others following suit in declaring independence. Indeed, a few days after the Ukrainian referendum, Georgian politicians told US officials that "the Ukrainian vote for independence opened the final act for the Soviet Union."³⁷ They were not mistaken, as the Soviet Union officially disbanded on December 25th, 1991.³⁸ That same day, President Bush finally recognized the independence of Ukraine, alongside four other former Soviet Republics.³⁹ In that speech, he emphasized that the US "applauds and supports the historic choice for freedom by the new states of the commonwealth. We congratulate them on the peaceful and democratic path they have chosen."⁴⁰ This belated support was too

³³ McEvoy-Levy, 101.

³⁴ Fink, 22.

³⁵ Fink, 12.

³⁶ Fink, 23.

³⁷ "Georgian Republic's Relations with Moscow." Diplomatic Cable from 'Collins' in Moscow to US Secretary of State. December 13, 1991. Wikileaks.

³⁸ Schmemann, Serge. "END OF THE SOVIET UNION; The Soviet State, Born of a Dream, Dies." *New York Times*. December 26, 1991.

³⁹ "U.S. Policy on Recognition of Former Soviet Republics: Press Guidance," Diplomatic Cable from US Secretary of State to All American Diplomatic Posts. December 28, 1991. Wikileaks,

⁴⁰ "U.S. Policy on Recognition," Diplomatic Cable.

little, too late for his domestic audience. In November 1992, Bush lost his re-election bid to Bill Clinton, a defeat that Fink attributes in part to his loss of the "East European ethnic vote."⁴¹

In fact, some scholars have argued that the Chicken Kiev speech encouraged plotters to go ahead with the coup against Gorbachev on 19 August.

Part Four: Reasons for the Chicken Kiev Speech

President Bush's speech exhorting Ukrainians to stay in the USSR was motivated by domestic, personal, and geostrategic interests. There were many domestic factors at play in his decision to discourage Ukrainian independence, most importantly the upcoming election. Within the US, the government was contending with the beginning of a recession in 1991. These growing domestic economic concerns led to a "general withdrawal of the American electorate from foreign affairs."⁴² Perhaps Bush thought that this gave him a freer rein over foreign policy. However, some conservative elements of the American public, like the Heritage Foundation, still favored independence for Ukraine —something Gorbachev had noted, but Bush had not.⁴³ Fur-

⁴¹ Fink, 11.

⁴² Savranakaya and Blanton, 799-800.

⁴³ "Document No. 135: Record of Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, First Private Meeting, Moscow." July 30, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016) 874.

thermore, the general American public was used to government rhetoric about liberating nations oppressed by Soviets. In fact, Bush himself had given a speech on July 12, calling for "freedom and independence... for every captive nation."⁴⁴ With this in mind, Bush probably should have foreseen how his Chicken Kiev speech, seemingly a complete turn from his usual message, would shock and horrify Americans.

Domestic opinion may have played a larger role than usual, due to the 1992 election in which Bush was running for a second term. He even mentioned the election in his Chicken Kiev speech, saying, "I go home to an active political process", and referring to Ukrainian-Americans from cities like Detroit, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, in a bid to appeal to a potential voting demographic.⁴⁵ A key part of his anticipated support base was the "Eastern European" ethnic vote, including Ukrainian-Americans. He even mentions them specifically in his speech, saying that "so many Ukrainian-Americans are with me in the remarks I've made here today."⁴⁶ With a population of between 740,000 and 1.5 million, a pro-Republican voting record going back to the Second World War, and an estimated 85% support for the Republican Party at the time, it was only natural that Bush felt he could count on their support.⁴⁷ He was also clearly confident that their support was solid enough to withstand his comments on Ukrainian independence. Likewise, Bush was not concerned about pushback from the Ukrainian-American lobby, which had historically been paralyzed with infighting.⁴⁸ Had he known how important the issue was to Ukrainian-Americans, and how much more organized their lobby had become in recent

⁴⁴ Fink, 13-14.

⁴⁵ "The President's Remarks," 50.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Fink, 11, 16, 26.

⁴⁸ Fink, 24.

years, he may have made a different choice.⁴⁹

Had he known how important the issue was to Ukrainian-Americans, and how much more organized their lobby had become in recent years, he may have made a different choice.

Relationship with Gorbachev

As McEvoy-Levy reports, some in the American media claimed that the Chicken Kiev speech "proved Bush's 'timidity and his susceptibility to influence from Gorbachev."⁵⁰ These claims of Gorbachev's influence are worth examining. Indeed, I argue that a large part of Bush's reasoning behind wanting to keep Ukraine in the USSR was out of concern for his personal friendship with Gorbachev. Historian of political friendships Yuri van Hoef distinguishes true friendship, "a reciprocal bond shared by two or more individuals based upon a shared understanding of each other, consisting out of perceived shared traits, virtues, opinions, agendas, etc." from the mere partnership, "a reciprocal bond shared by two or more individuals that is based on mutual material or immaterial advantage and, either explicitly or inexplicitly, ruled by the thought of quid pro quo."⁵¹ He argues that Bush and Gorbachev had both a political partnership and personal friendship.⁵²

Bush, and Reagan before him had worked hard to build a cooperative partnership with Gorbachev and the USSR. As Republican senator Robert Dole asserted, "Safeguarding the co-operative relationship was essential to the maintenance of security in the 'new world order'."⁵³ Bush naturally wanted to continue that cooperation in Soviet internal reform, weapons treaties, and Middle East-

⁴⁹ Ibid. 26.

⁵⁰ McEvoy-Levy, 101.

⁵¹ Van Hoef, "Friendship in World Politics," 68-69.

⁵² Ibid. 78.

⁵³ Ibid. 101.

ern policy. According to Bush administration official Robert B. Zoellick, continuing Soviet reforms was a major motivator, as Bush was "genuinely concerned that the breakup of the Soviet Union would undermine Moscow's reform."⁵⁴ While Bush and Gorbachev's partnership experienced tense periods, including the Baltic crisis,⁵⁵ their relationship was remarkably strong.⁵⁶ While the pro-Bush Zoellick claims that the President generally "devoted exceptional energy to building personal ties of respect, trust, and even friendship," Gorbachev still seems to be a special case.⁵⁷ Bush himself wrote that he was "probably less suspicious of Gorbachev than were others in [his] team"⁵⁸ and told Gorbachev: "I want to prove that and work with you."⁵⁹ Bush certainly proved it in the Ukrainian case by not only discouraging independence but also showing Gorbachev his speech and even allowing him to add the infamous "suicidal nationalism" phrase.⁶⁰

However, Bush and Gorbachev's relationship was not merely professional. Bush also showed extraordinary concern for Gorbachev's dignity over the years. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Bush did not openly celebrate, as he did not want to "jeopardize his relationship with Gorbachev for a mere victory celebration."⁶¹ Bush also delayed his recognition of

the Baltic states to help Gorbachev preserve his "dignity."⁶² Concerned for Gorbachev's feelings to the end, Bush waited until the Soviet leader had resigned to recognize Ukraine officially.⁶³ Transcripts of their phone calls and meetings add further proof to this interpretation, as Bush calls Gorbachev "my friend"⁶⁴ and Gorbachev calls him "My dearest George."⁶⁵ Indeed, van Hoef argues that Bush's "clear personal concern for the well-being of Gorbachev," the long-lasting nature of their friendship that extends "to this day," and the friendship between their wives points to a true personal friendship rather than a political relationship.⁶⁶ Thus, beyond wishing to preserve a useful partner, Bush probably also had an emotional incentive to assist Gorbachev.

Desire for Stability

In the speech, Bush stated that "We will maintain the strongest possible relationship with the Soviet Government of President Gorbachev."⁶⁷ This dedication to the continuation of the Soviet state at first seems entirely at odds with US foreign policy objectives. Yet, looking more closely, it becomes clear that Bush's first priority was stability. In order to achieve that stability, Ukraine had to remain in the Soviet Union. Bush believed that maintaining the USSR would bolster global stability in three ways: by providing the US with a valuable strategic partner, by preventing nuclear proliferation, and by avoiding the kind of ethnic violence seen in Yugoslavia.

First of all, Bush wanted to maintain the strategic simplicity of a cooperative bipolar

⁶² Zoellick, 562-564.

⁶³ Fink, 23.

⁶⁴ "Document No. 124" in Savranakaya and Blanton, 829.

⁶⁵ "Document No. 143: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 12:19 p.m. – 12:31 p.m." August 21, 1991. In Savranakaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016) 829. [EBSCO]

⁶⁶ Fink, 11.

⁶¹ Yuri Van Hoef, "Friendship in world politics: Assessing the personal relationships between Kohl and Mitterrand, and Bush and Gorbachev." *AMITY: The Journal of Friendship Studies* 2, no. 1 (2014): 77.

world order. McEvoy-Levy argues that "'Mutual advantage' and collaboration remained the central themes of Republican / Administrative discourse on US-Soviet relations."⁶⁸ President Bush particularly wanted to maintain US-Soviet cooperation in foreign affairs. Gorbachev's support to the US in the Gulf War made the strategic importance of Soviet assistance very clear to Bush. In a call between Bush and the Armenian President, Shevardnadze spoke about the cooperation: "We were good partners in the Middle East. Certainly, there were times where we had slight disagreements."⁶⁹ Bush replied enthusiastically that "[those disagreements] didn't bother us at all. We understand Mikhail Gorbachev's position. The Soviet Union stayed with us to the end."⁷⁰ Thus, Bush enjoyed having a partner in his Middle Eastern venture and foresaw assistance on that front in future.

Nowhere was this desire for continued collaboration more obvious than in Bush's support for Gorbachev's Union Treaty. Bush fully supported the project and made sure Gorbachev knew that, even telling him outright, "in no way do I intend to support separatism."⁷¹ Prior to his Kyiv visit, Bush personally told Gorbachev that he would do everything he could to not "aggravate the existing problems or interfere in the question of when Ukraine will sign the Union Treaty."⁷² It is therefore not surprising that Bush included messages of support for the Union Treaty in his Chicken Kiev Speech, such as: "The nine-plus-one agreement holds forth the hope that Republics will combine greater autonomy with greater voluntary interaction -- political, social, cultural, economic -- rather than pursuing the hope-

⁶⁸ McEvoy-Levy, 101.

⁶⁹ "Document No. 123" in Savranakaya and Blanton, 821.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Savranakaya and Blanton, 809; "Document No. 135" in Savranakaya and Blanton, 874.

⁷² "Document No. 135" in Savranakaya and Blanton, 873.

less course of isolation."⁷³ He further instructed Ukrainians, whom he referred to as "Soviet citizens," to "forge a new social compact" within the USSR.⁷⁴

Second, Bush also foresaw serious drawbacks if the USSR were to collapse. The major American fear was the spread of nuclear weapons throughout a dozen new states. Safire defends the administration's concern on this matter, saying that "The fear [of Soviet disintegration] is not irrational: tight central control of the Soviet nuclear command "football" is in our vital national interest."⁷⁵ Putting it more crudely, Zoellick cites worries about "loose nukes" in the hands of ex-Soviet states.⁷⁶ Indeed, in Bush's December 25 address finally recognizing an independent Ukraine, he specifically praised "their careful attention to nuclear control and safety during this transition."⁷⁷

Third, Bush was also quite concerned about the "ethnic hatred" that could accompany the USSR's disintegration and the potential further disintegration of Ukraine.⁷⁸ Gorbachev's rhetoric and the ongoing conflicts in Yugoslavia exacerbated these fears. Nevertheless, this justification for maintaining Soviet unity was more acceptable to the American public, as even Bush's harsh critic Safire admitted, "We are also rightly concerned about the local pogroms and border clashes that disunion may bring."⁷⁹ Indeed, many writers at the time expressed concern about minority rights within the new state of Ukraine,⁸⁰ paying attention to Bush's comment that "we judge whether a country is really free [by] the amount of se-

⁷³ "The President's Remarks," 49.

⁷⁴ "The President's Remarks," 50.

⁷⁵ Safire, "After the Fall," *New York Times*.

⁷⁶ Zoellick, 563.

⁷⁷ "U.S. Policy on Recognition," *Diplomatic Cable*.

⁷⁸ "The President's Remarks," 48.

⁷⁹ Safire, "After the Fall," *New York Times*.

⁸⁰ "Chicken Kiev, the Sequel," *New York Times*, November 30, 1991, 18. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]

curity enjoyed by minorities.⁸¹ Considering the sizeable ethnic minority in Ukraine, Bush's security concerns are especially relevant: observers worried that these populations may bear the brunt of anti-Soviet, separatist discrimination from other Ukrainians.⁸²

The potential for civil discord between anti-Soviet groups and ethnic minorities raised concerns of further secession of majority Russian areas, like Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, away from the Ukrainian state.⁸³ Indeed, Scowcroft claimed years later that the Chicken Kiev speech "was not about Ukraine staying with the Soviet Union. It was about Ukraine not breaking up into its constituent parts."⁸⁴ The situation in Yugoslavia, which was rapidly collapsing into civil war, heightened these fears of ethnic violence.⁸⁵ Gorbachev himself insisted on the parallels, both domestically, where he gave a speech to Parliament about the "unfolding events in Yugoslavia,"⁸⁶ and internationally, where he insisted to Bush: "We need the Union. Take the Yugoslav example... It gives us an idea of what could happen if the Union disintegrates."⁸⁷ Thus, the unfolding ethnic war on Yugoslavia provided a graphic image of what the disintegration of the USSR could look like, exacerbating fear about the diplomatic, ethnic and nuclear stability of a post-Soviet world order.

Finally, all of this reasoning was premised on the American Government's understanding of the situation in the USSR. While Bush

⁸¹ "The President's Remarks," 48.

⁸² "Message to Kiev," *The Economist*, and "Chicken Kiev, the Sequel," *New York Times*.

⁸³ "Chicken Kiev, the Sequel," *New York Times*, and Savranakaya and Blanton, 889.

⁸⁴ Hadzewycz, "Brzezinski, Scowcroft Discuss," 12.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Savranakaya and Blanton, 812.

⁸⁷ "Document No. 133: Memorandum of Conversation, G-7 Meeting with President Gorbachev, London, 2:20 p.m. – 6:15 p.m." July 17, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016) 857. [EBSCO]

proudly proclaimed in his speech that "we also appreciate the new realities of life in the U.S.S.R." the US government did not.⁸⁸ As *The Economist* put it in February 1992, the Bush Administration "failed to spot that its independence was unstoppable, and tried to discourage it."⁸⁹ The Bush Administration failed to see the signs of the USSR's imminent demise, such as growing unrest, rising nationalism, and Ukrainian anger about the Chernobyl disaster. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had already told US officials about the "very serious" and concerning "level of instability" in the USSR.⁹⁰ In terms of the appetite for independence, years later, Scowcroft stated that Gorbachev had "grossly underestimated nationalist sentiments in the various parts of the Soviet Union," but this is also true of the Bush administration.⁹¹ Indeed, Fink argues that the USSR has always understood the threat of its own nationalism better than the US.⁹² The nationalists also had strong leadership. In the Ukrainian case, their leader was President Leonid Kravchuk, who, according to Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was "the most adamant about reducing the center's powers vis-a-vis the center."⁹³ Finally, Bush underestimated Ukrainian anger at the Chernobyl disaster. While he acknowledged it as a tragedy: "You should know that America's heart -- the hearts of all -- went out to the

⁸⁸ "The President's Remarks," 48.

⁸⁹ "Message to Kiev." *The Economist*, February 8, 1992, 15. [ProQuest]

⁹⁰ "Document No. 123: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 1:40 p.m. – 2:25 p.m." May 6, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016) 820. [EBSCO]

⁹¹ Markian Hadzewycz, "Brzezinski, Scowcroft Discuss Future of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Ukrainian Weekly*, August 16, 2009, 12.

⁹² Fink, 15.

⁹³ "Armenia Pursues Independence." Diplomatic Cable from 'Collins' in Moscow, to US Secretary of State. May 21, 1991. Wikileaks.

people here at the time of Chernobyl,"⁹⁴ he failed to recognize that it had also become a catalyst for independence movements. Chernobyl served as proof of how little the Soviet centre cared for its Ukrainian periphery. Meanwhile, a blithely ignorant Bush reported that "There's confidence in Moscow that the Ukraine will come along on the Union Treaty."⁹⁵ Thus, it should be noted that Bush's political calculations were also based on incorrect information.

Indeed, Scowcroft claimed years later that the Chicken Kiev speech "was not about Ukraine staying with the Soviet Union. It was about Ukraine not breaking up into its constituent parts."

Conclusion

While President Bush's speech publicly discouraging Ukrainian independence seems utterly at odds with Cold War American foreign policy, it was in fact carefully crafted to further both Bush's personal interests and American policies at the time. By 1991, the US was invested in the continued existence of the USSR as a polity; it was a valuable geopolitical partner and a bulwark against ethnic war and nuclear proliferation. Seen in this light, Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech makes more sense – Ukrainian independence was not worth the loss of a beneficial world order. Bush tried to walk a fine line between acknowledging national aspirations and loyalty to his Soviet partner but ended up losing both his partner and the respect of East European nationalists. Unfortunately for Bush, his plan was premised on a misunderstanding of both his popularity domestically and the political situation in the USSR. As Fink put it, "the White House clung desperately to the

⁹⁴ "The President's Remarks," 49.

⁹⁵ Fink, 17.

old order."⁹⁶ Alas, the old order was gone.

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⁸⁸ "Armenia Pursues Independence." Diplomatic Cable from 'Collins' in Moscow, to US Secretary of State. May 21, 1991. Wikileaks. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/91MOSCOW13989_a.html

⁸⁹ "Chicken Kiev, the Sequel." *New York Times*, November 30, 1991, 18. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]

⁹⁰ "Document No. 123: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 1:40 p.m. – 2:25 p.m." May 6, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 820-824. [EBSCO]

⁹¹ "Document No. 124: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:03 a.m. – 9:47 a.m." May 11, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 825-829. [EBSCO]

⁹² "Document No. 133: Memorandum of Conversation, G-7 Meeting with President Gorbachev, London, 2:20 p.m. – 6:15 p.m." July 17, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 855-863. [EBSCO]

⁹³ "Document No. 135: Record of Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, First Private Meeting, Moscow." July 30, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 868-879.

⁹⁴ "Document No. 143: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 12:19 p.m. – 12:31 p.m." August 21, 1991. In Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Anna Melyakova. *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 923-925.

⁹⁵ Fink, 11.

THE ID, INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITY, AND THE GENESIS OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

ANVESH JAIN

Nations are not singular units, with concrete traits and immovable, essential and unchanging characteristics. They are the products of individuals, millions and billions of them, with their unyielding aspirations and desires, sets of lurid expression and deeply-held beliefs. To make sense of them cannot be an etic undertaking or an exercise in physiognomy. To know how a country 'ticks', to predict how it might act with respect to others, look to the make-up of its society; to the accumulation of ids and impulsions, the strands of thought and the historical, intellectual doctrines that permeate distinct factions and sects contesting one another in the creation of some complete enterprise.

Individual personalities, as manifest in leaders and the teams of advisers that guide them, are informed by the dyadic pathos of

upbringing and experience. Personality ineluctably shapes the methods, impressions, and 'toolboxes' that these practitioners of foreign policy bring with them to the halls of high office. Personality dictates the red lines that leaders hold themselves to in the dispensation and use of national power - those "cardinal beliefs" that Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of, regarding the relationship between his United Kingdom and the United States, the recognition that "we do think the same, we do feel the same, and we have the same sense... that if there is a problem you've got to act on it".¹ Strategy and policy are not hard sciences, with predictable formulae and rote, inevitable outcomes. Rather, they are crafted and pursued by humans and are concerned with the erratic logic and illogic of human behaviour.

¹ James Naughtie, *The Accidental American* (PublicAffairs: New York, 2004), 129-130.

Those at the helm are, of course, bound by their assumptions, their understandings of what it means to act rationally and deliberately, and by the racial, gendered, and cultural contours of their *weltanschauung* (world-view). Different individuals arrive with their separate constructions of the state, the responsibilities of civil society, and even the nature of time and agency in the realm of international affairs. The exigencies of global politics bring cultures into direct contact with one another and not always in perfectly congruent ways.

Personality ineluctably shapes the methods, impressions, and 'toolboxes' that these practitioners of foreign policy bring with them to the halls of high office.

In Canada's eighteen-year-long experience on the International Control Commission in Vietnam, a generation of diplomatic cadres found themselves in a state of bewilderment when confronted with the jungles and pagodas of the Indochinese frontier. Their preconceptions and "mental maps" had been configured in certain "racialized ways in which policy-makers pictured and tried to understand a complex world spatially," attuned more to the familiar centres of the North Atlantic rather than the far-flung geographies of Southeast Asia.² These maps and jolts, in turn, impacted the way Canadian diplomats went about their work, relaying information back to Ottawa and interacting with the population in situ.

Diplomats and the makers of external policy are indeed human (as shocking a revelation as any). Their approach to strategic affairs is decidedly reflected by their individual tastes and sensibilities, far beneath any grander ideations on questions of justice, good, and evil. Religion cannot be divorced from the making of

² Brendan Kelly, "'Six mois à Hanoi': Marcel Cadieux, Canada, and the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 1954-5," *Canadian Historical Review* 99, no. 3 (September 2018): 402.

foreign policy either: the persecution of Catholics in North Vietnam evoked special sympathy from Christian Western officials,³ and imagery of brimstone and divine hellfire intimately accompanies today's debates on war and intervention. The transformative nature of faith convinced President George W. Bush, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, that "his country [was] involved in a struggle against evil" and that waging war against international terrorism was "what [he] was put on this earth for."⁴ His interpretation of events relied on his own experience with the message of Christ, one that inspired him to break with an "aimless and alcoholic" past,⁵ giving new life and new meaning to the American national struggle in a world of Manichean moral systems. Personal transformations became the resolute basis for sweeping national and international ones. A society can thus be reformed and remade, just as the errant and repentant individual might be. Individuals matter in foreign policy, as do collectivities. The discourses between individuals matter too, for the sum of diplomacy would not be possible without the characteristic influences of its component parts.

Personal transformations became the resolute basis for sweeping national and international ones. A society can thus be reformed and remade, just as the errant and repentant individual might be.

Innate tenets of faith aside, other learned ideas and ideologies go forge an individual's external relations praxis, and their ability to identify and classify threats. In times of upheaval, the individuals that make and shape the world often retreat into what they know of it, falling back on more comfortable generalizations. The lessons of the Vietnam War taught certain American commentators to fear overreach, in-

³ Kelly, "'Six mois à Hanoi,'" 409.

⁴ Robert Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*

cluding The Atlantic's George Packer; others, the neoconservatives, learned to rebuke American drift from global affairs.⁶ After 9/11, that epochal splinter, some saw heavily militarized rogue states such as Iran and North Korea to be the major threats to liberal hegemony.⁷ It was to be these latter views on great power warfare and the necessity of realigning the Middle East, borne from their memory of the Cold War, that ultimately misled the architects of the Iraq blunder. Humans envisage threats as they materialize before their eyes, at which point they are to be accordingly neutralized. In the heuristic murk, the primeval brain may easily confuse brambles for bears and thickets for tigers.

The prevalence and place of individual personality have even been used to argue what constitutes proper 'international relations' or 'foreign policy' in the first measure. There are those that deride the republican or revolutionary tradition of offering the wider public a say in national strategy, instead of enshrining the philosophy of the continental realists who view "the best foreign policy [as] the product of a single great master: a Bismarck, a Talleyrand, a Metternich, or a Kissinger."⁸ Here, there is little place for the "vulgar and mercantile" moorings of economics and trade or the more innominate renderings of 'soft power'.⁹ For some, foreign policy continues to remain a project that reached its natural apotheosis only in the 19th-century European states system, marked by the alacrity and brilliance of individual statesmen, sitting in dim rooms and making vital feints and plays up and down the cartographic gameboard.

This perspective veers dangerously close to the so-called 'Great Man' theory of history that reifies the prophetic power of fated individuals to bring about social change. Individuals and their personalities do not and cannot exist in a vacuum. Try as they might, no person is totally free to enact their desires as they see fit; no amount

⁶ George Packer, *Assassin's Gate* (Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux: New York, 2005): 18.

⁷ Ibid., 40.

⁸ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence* (Routledge: New York, 2002): 39.

⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 38.

of individual fortitude or diplomatic nous can overcome basic facts of geography or economy. An Icelandic leader of great probity and strength may never access the same breadth or depth of strategic options made concurrently available to even the weakest American President.

The prevalence and place of individual personality have even been used to argue what constitutes proper 'international relations' or 'foreign policy' in the first measure.

All individuals are inherently constrained by the resources available to them - personality may, however, play a role in the creative accounting of these strategic resources and the unconventional deployment of them in times of crisis and decision-making. Had Al Gore been elected in 2000 instead of Bush, he would have possessed the same access to data and information. The interpretation of the data and the pathways made available to him (as informed by his own biases and dogmas) would probably have been quite differentiated from those that Bush eventually embarked upon. In Canada, a potential Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, may have approached the Iraq issue in a manner quite unlike actual Prime Minister Jean Chrétien did in 2003, drawing instead on conservative cultural values and the perceived necessity of Anglophone unity in his concept of foreign policy. This is, of course, merely a counterfactual, and can never be reproduced scientifically or established as an absolute truth. Still, it is true that incalculable factors and stresses are involved in the making of a leader, going on to then influence their political mandate and their incredibly specific 'way' of being in the world.

The institutions and apparatuses of the state may have some restraining effect on the most ambitious individuals, but the potential for

these individuals, in turn, to shape institutions and fashion new ones in their image must not be dismissed either. Prime Minister Pearson had a total hold over the Department of External Affairs in his time, to the extent that his predecessor John G. Diefenbaker often complained about the bureaucratic terror imposed by the legions of 'Pearsonalities' embedded in the civil service. The outsized effect of personality is especially demonstrated in smaller departments with a tight-knit, professional corps, as was the case in Canada from the 1930s to the 1960s.

Personality clashes between individual leaders also influence the contact between their governments and the smooth or rough coordination of policies, as exemplified by the infamously sour relations between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and American President John F. Kennedy. Their generational divide only exacerbated differences of opinion on matters, including the implementation of the BOMARC nuclear missile system and the pursuit of Cold War strategy towards Red China, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Pearson had spent years working in international institutions, developing useful connections with political and diplomatic leadership from across the United Kingdom and the United States, which he frequently called upon later in his premiership.

There is, then, a relationship between the individual and history, and history and the individual. The repeated iteration of this relationship in particular localities, and across temporal geographies, contributes to and constitutes an inherited 'tradition', a school of thought passed down across generations of political leadership. It is in this sense that one can decipher a revolutionary instinct in the foundational expression of "American Internationalism", one that stretches back to Washington's crossing of the Delaware and the subsequent ripples of his War of Independence against the British monarchy.¹⁰ This revolutionary patrimony explains

¹⁰ Tony Smith, *A Pact with the Devil* (Routledge: New York, 2007): 45.

how the United States can conceive of itself as an anti-colonial or reformist power (even as it dominates the international system), providing an ideological thread-line that extends through to the Bush and Obama administrations' missions to export democracy elsewhere. In foreign policy, leaders are not only burdened by the immediate realities of competing for endogenous pressures and a protean exogenous environment but also by the weight of the past and the sense that their undertakings are guided by history and exist within established national contours and frames of referential propriety.

States and their foreign policy can be said to exist as the sum of their citizens' collective neuroses, particularly in the case of democratic governance, whereupon the leader and their cabinet must seek approval directly from the public or the legislature that represents the public. Individuals who rise to the top of their respective societies represent an accretion of id, ego, and impulses, motivated by an experiential approach towards creating their unique brand of foreign policy. Statecraft is an entirely human endeavour, insofar as humans can exist within and impose structures of engagement upon one another; thus, it will always be informed and influenced by individual natures, personalities, and their styles of interaction and interpretation. The relationship between states mirrors the relationship between their peoples, embodied in the traits and characteristics of a select (and hopefully representative) few, at or near the top.

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Regarding the Role of Superpowers in the Horn of Africa

SINAN VAN DER HOEVEN

Global superpowers and their interests have played a major role in creating and aggravating domestic grievances, national consciousness, and regional conflict in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is a peninsula located in Eastern Africa, consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, and the peninsula's strategic geopolitical location has led to multiple instances of great-power involvement within the region. Colonial superpowers like France, Britain, and Italy were mainly responsible for the creation of these grievances, while Cold War superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union were responsible for aggravating the existing grievances and preventing the achievement of sustainable peace in the region. Colonial administrations' actions, such as partitioning Somalia into five regions, oppressive Italian rule and British secession denial in Eritrea, and France's intentional racial divide between Afars and Issas in Djibouti, hold great responsibility in laying the foundation for

current grievances that plague the Horn of Africa with conflict. Superpower activity and interests in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War impacted secession movements and civil conflict in the region, such as in the United States' and Soviet Union's influence on the conflicts involving Somalia and the Eritrean secession struggle. With regard to peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives taken in the Horn of Africa, exogenous influence and tampering caused the demise of peacemaking processes in Somalia in the past, but local solution-making created sustainable peacebuilding in Djibouti. Regional economic integration is a viable solution to promote sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa and leaders of countries in this region are already taking active steps towards this cause. Integration is a slow process but is the most effective way to sustainably heal the long-standing grievances between the nations of this region.

Impact of colonial superpowers:

Colonial administrations have had a direct impact on creating grievances and laying the foundation for conflict among and within nations in the Horn of Africa, whether directly colonized or not. In her study on the civil war in Sudan, A.J. Ayers draws attention to the fact that many of the problems branded as domestic by Westerners are rooted in grievances caused by colonial policies, especially with forging group identities. This is also observed in Somalia and Eritrea.¹ In 1884, the colonial powers, led by Britain and Italy, divided the Somali peninsula into five different regions, giving administration to European powers -- France, Italy, Britain-- as well as Ethiopia, for cooperating with the European colonial powers.² Each colonial administration instituted their own legislations and "modernization" processes, creating new institutions which completely ignored pre-existing societal norms and dynamics. For example, in his article on the secessionist movement in Somaliland, Seth Kaplan draws attention to the fact that anthropologists describe traditional Somali society as lacking a centralized state and instead being characterized by a distribution of power between differing clans.³ The colonial division of Somalia by the European powers, followed with the attempt to create a centralized Somali state contradicted this and has therefore led to prolonged conflict in the region.

As the newly established administrations were created to extract resources and enhance European colonial goals, distrust between clans, and distrust towards a centralized state grew even more entrenched within Somalian society, further emphasizing the long-term fragmenting effect of multiple colonial administrations of

¹ A. J. Ayers, "Beyond the Ideology of 'Civil War': The Global-Historical Constitution of Political Violence in Sudan," *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 4, no. 10 (2012): 266.

² Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam, and Peacebuilding* (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 19.

³ Seth Kaplan, "The Remarkable Story of Somaliland," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (July 2008): 146.

Somalia.

Global superpowers and their interests have played a major role in creating and aggravating domestic grievances, national consciousness, and regional conflict in the Horn of Africa.

While not experiencing the same level of division, Eritrea also experienced a similar magnitude of impact from the Italian colonial administration. Following the power vacuum created by the death of Emperor Yohannes II, Italy established the colony of Italian Eritrea in 1889 and completely restructured how society functioned in the region.⁴ In his article on Eritrean decolonization, Redie Bereketeab lays out three analytical dimensions directly derived from Italian colonial rule precipitating the creation of Eritrean national consciousness.⁵ Territorial integration (the creation of concrete visible borders between Italian Eritrea and Ethiopia), socio-economic integration (various ethno-linguistic groups interacting with one another within the social and economic parameters created by the Italian colonial administrations), and politico-legal integration (centralization and standardization of legal procedures) were all major features of the Italian rule in Eritrea and thus helped shaped a common history amongst the peoples living in the colony, laying the groundwork for national consciousness. During the post-Second World War decolonization period, Eritrea was forcibly federated with Ethiopia, under Ethiopia's claim that Eritrea was an integral part of the Ethiopian Empire before its colonization.⁶ While true to a cer-

⁴ "Abyssinia," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 93.

⁵ Redie Bereketeab, "Eritrea, a Colonial Creation," in *Self-Determination and Secession in Africa* (London & New York: Routledge, 2015), 235-237.

⁶ Kidane Mengisteab, "The OAU Doctrine on Colonial Boundaries and Conflicts of Separation in the Horn of Africa," in *Self-Determination and Secession in Africa*, ed. Redie Bereketeab (London & New York: Routledge, 2015), 40-41.

tain extent, this claim also completely ignored the new political identity that the people of Eritrea had gained over the years of colonization. Ethiopia's claim over the Ogaden region, located between the Somalia-Ethiopia border, also relies on colonial history and reaffirmation by global powers, thus leading to yet another regional conflict directly relating to colonial consequences, demonstrating once again the long-term impact of colonialism on the creation of new grievances in the Horn of Africa.⁷

A final example of conflict that stems from colonial administration is found in Djibouti. When Djibouti was first colonized by France in 1862, the colonial government had no intention to develop its infrastructure aside from Djibouti City, as the French sought after this small, resource-poor country entirely for its geopolitically advantageous location. As Mohamed Kadamy puts it in an article on ethno-political tension in Djibouti, the colonial administration's main policy was to "negate the existence of the Afars" as, prior to Djibouti's colonization, the Afars held power in the country and were viewed as an obstacle to further colonial penetration.⁸ Aside from the grievances that are commonly associated with colonialism, after the decolonization of Djibouti, political power was almost entirely transferred to the Issas-dominated People's Rally for Progress party, further perpetuating the colonial notion of exclusion from political power and the marginalization of the Afars. This led to the creation of many differing Afar groups, with some like the Afar Liberation Front seeking to secede and create an independent "greater Afar" out of portions of present-day Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, while others like the eventually successful Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) seeking to maintain the territorial integrity of

modern-day Djibouti.⁹ In past literature, scholars such as Peter Schraeder have used the term "boiling cauldron" to explain ethno-political turmoil in Djibouti and while correct, scholars who use this term mainly focus on the domestic aspects of the conflict and neglect the French colonial administration's involvement in furthering and solidifying grievances between the Afars and Issas, two groups which possessed a strong social network formed on social and economic integration prior to French colonization.¹⁰ The end of the Djibouti Civil War, further examined in the last section of this essay, provides a model for sustainable peacebuilding and a solid example for the concept of African solutions for African problems.

Each colonial administration instituted their own legislations and "modernization" processes, creating new institutions which completely ignored pre-existing societal norms and dynamics.

Impact of Cold War Superpowers:

The decolonization period in Africa between the 1950s and the 1970s led to the formation of a magnitude of independent states, but superpowers still held interests in the continent and foreign involvement within local conflicts remained high during the Cold War period. While the colonial administrations laid the groundwork for the creation of grievances in the Horn of Africa, Cold War superpowers, United States and the Soviet Union, exacerbated these grievances in their attempts to further their own national interests and gains. Cold War conflicts in the Horn of Africa were characterized by the deepening of clan divisions and the continuation of state repression after decolonization, leading to secessionist movements, border disputes, and constant conflict. As Samuel Makinda argues in his 1982

⁷ Kidane Mengisteab, "The OAU Doctrine on Colonial Boundaries and Conflicts of Separation in the Horn of Africa," in *Self-Determination and Secession in Africa*, ed. Redie Berketewa (London & New York: Routledge, 2015).

p. 46

⁸ Mohamed Kadamy, "Djibouti: Between War and Peace," *Review of African Political Economy* 23, no. 70 (December 1996): 512.

⁹ Peter J. Schraeder, "Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From 'Eye of the Hurricane' to 'Boiling Cauldron,'" *African Affairs* 92, no. 367 (April 1993): 213.

¹⁰ Schraeder, 205.

article "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa", the Cold War superpowers added an entire new dimension to the conflicts in this region as they continued to arm states and separatist groups alike for their own interests, providing the means for the conflicts to prolong.¹¹ Moreover, the cases of Somaliland and Eritrea demonstrate that successful secession and the process of creating a new country largely depends on the geopolitical interests of superpowers and much less so on the colonial past or national consciousness of these states.¹²

Following decolonization, Somali leaders adopted a pan-Somali ideology to gain popularity with the Somalian diaspora in the Horn of Africa and sustain power. Leaders called for the reunification of all Somali-inhabited areas, including Djibouti, North Eastern Kenya, and the Ogaden region, which was under the administration of Ethiopia. Despite this call for unity among Somalians, clan politics and ingrained grievances resulted in the assassination of President Abdul Rashid Shermake in October 1969, and the subsequent power vacuum led to a coup orchestrated by General Mohammed Siad Barre who suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, and banned all political parties.¹³ Somali poet Qasim described the Somali state's use and abuse of power by writing, "there is no difference between the infidel I expelled and the one that occupies the [parliament]," highlighting the oppressive nature of the superpower-backed post-colonial Somali state.¹⁴

This same government actively sought military conflict with neighbouring Ethiopia to

¹¹ Samuel M. Makinda, "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (January 1982): 98.

¹² 史密斯, "Mediation in a Critical Perspective," 2020.

¹³ Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay, and Mbuga Karanja, "African Solutions for African Conflicts: Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Africa," in *Shaping a New Africa*, ed. Abdullah A. Mohamoud (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: KIT Publishers, 2007), 36-37.

¹⁴ Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam, and Peacebuilding* (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 20.



"reclaim" the contested Ogaden regime with arms and supplies provided by the United States. The United States' aimed to destabilize the communist Ethiopian regime and weaken Soviet influence in the geopolitically significant Horn of Africa; however, Cuba and the Soviet Union's direct intervention in the conflict became a major factor for collapse of the Somali state.¹⁵ After Somalia's state failure, Somaliland sought to secede and obtain independence as the Somaliland administration was capable of providing state services for people living in the region, but as Martin Riegl and Bohumil Dobos argue in their article, despite Somaliland's historical ties with the United Kingdom, the government was not able to gather support from superpowers for their secession movement, and therefore still lacked international recognition as an independent state. Somalia's oppressive post-colonial military regime was an outcome of grievances caused by colonial administrations, but General Mohammed Siad Barre's government was able to wage its wars and continue its oppression because the Horn of Africa was a key battleground for proxy wars in the Soviet Union and the United States' power struggle.

Eritrea suffered a fate similar to Somaliland's, where their geopolitical significance and United States interests prevented their secession during the Cold War; however, after the Cold War ended and the United States' interests in the region shifted, Eritrean secession was allowed. The United States government wanted

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 19

to retain their influence in the Horn of Africa during the decolonization process that spread across the continent. To create a bridge between national interests and Eritrea's independence movement, the United States "proposed" the creation of a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. While this appeared to be a compromise, as federation allowed Eritrea the right to self-govern to a certain extent, but the United States also supported the Ethiopian government while they took measures that intended to strongly diminish Eritrean national identity, such as replacing the Eritrean flag, languages, and holidays with Ethiopian ones, further entrenching grievances between the two nations.¹⁶ In his book *Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics*, Okbazghi Yohannes outlines U.S. foreign policy-related anxiety that an independent Eritrea would align with the Arab world due to its large Muslim population, threatening American and Israeli interests in the region.¹⁷ Furthermore, Yohannes quotes the official U.S. position on the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict which states "considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that [Eritrea] has to be linked with our ally, Ethiopia", providing fur-



ther evidence for Andrew Preston's argument in *Monsters Everywhere* that reaching "total security" strongly shaped U.S. foreign policy, even if it came at the expense of the independence of

¹⁶ Redie Berketeba, "Eritrea, a Colonial Creation," in *Self-Determination and Secession in Africa* (London & New York: Routledge, 2015), 249.

¹⁷ Okbazghi Yohannes, *Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991).

a nation struggling to decolonize.¹⁸ Eventually, Eritrean secession became more favorable for the United States' geopolitical interests in the region, leading to the United Nations officially recognizing the independent state of Eritrea in 1993, but the difficult process Eritrea had to pursue to reach that recognition fueled by superpower interests further deepened pre-existing grievances.

While the colonial administrations laid the groundwork for the creation of grievances in the Horn of Africa, Cold War superpowers, United States and the Soviet Union, exacerbated these grievances in their attempts to further their own national interests and gains.

Sustainable Peacebuilding:

While conflict stemming from superpower interests has plagued and damaged the Horn of Africa since the late 1800s, unsuccessful and inadequate peacemaking processes have had equal or worse consequences for the region. The international community sponsored five major conferences to create peace in Somalia, all held outside of its borders, and all these attempts have failed due to a combination of foreign and domestic factors. Some of the faction leaders that participated in the conferences believed they could still win the war and gain control through military victory, and thus were not interested in negotiated settlement. For example, after one of the peace talks in Djibouti, General Mohamed Farah Aideed rejected the peace deal, even though his representatives had signed an agreement.¹⁹ On the other hand, the conferences on the Somali conflict also failed due to foreign interference. For example, after the Cairo Peace Accord, the Ethio-

¹⁸ Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 3 (June 2014): 477–500.

¹⁹ Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam, and Peacebuilding* (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 23.

pian government convinced Colonel Adbullahi Yusuf and General Aden Abdullahi Nur to quit the conference, undermining progress made. In another instance, a transitional government for Somalia was formed after the 2004 peace conference in Kenya, but Ethiopia dominated the peace conference, rewarding warlords who were sympathetic towards the Ethiopian government by appointing them as members of parliament and cabinet, further antagonizing nationalist intellectuals and Islamists in Somalia.²⁰ Countries like Eritrea and Egypt were not pleased with the outcome of the conference and decided to work towards undermining this peace process by providing supplies and arms to opposing groups.²¹ The peace agreements were not only poorly implemented, but were drafted and largely steered by foreign states, providing no sustainable solution to the Somalian conflict. Various scholars have suggested and emphasized the importance of creating "African solutions for African conflicts", but the case of Somalia demonstrates that a people-based solution created directly by Somalis is more important than importing a peace plan for Somalia.²²

Various scholars have suggested and emphasized the importance of creating "African solutions for African conflicts", but the case of Somalia demonstrates that a people-based solution created directly by Somalis is more important than importing a peace plan for Somalia.

To overcome and heal grievances created by colonial regimes and perpetuated by Cold War superpowers, solutions created by locals who have directly witnessed and experienced griev-

²⁰ Abdi Elmi, 23.

²¹ Abdi Elmi, 23.

²² Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay, and Mbuga Karanja, "African Solutions for African Conflicts: Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Africa," in *Shaping a New Africa*, ed. Abdullah A. Mohamoud (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: KIT Publishers, 2007). p. 49-54

ances is of higher importance. As explored earlier, the Djiboutian civil war was largely caused by ethno-political tension that was enhanced through inequalities stemming from the French colonial administrations divide and conquer policies. The solution to the conflict arose through peace talks between the Issa- and Afar-led groups, where political recognition and integration was identified as the main concern. The final agreement saw Ali Mohammed Daoud and Ougoure Kifle, the main rebel leaders, join the government's cabinet as ministers of health and agriculture, respectively.²³ Further, the FRUD committed themselves to a peaceful resolution to the civil war and transformed the FRUD into a political party. While pressure from French and American interests played a notable role in leading the president of Djibouti to adopt a peaceful solution to the civil war, the domestic peace process, the willingness to reach a peace agreement to mend past grievances, and the lack of foreign meddling all created an environment for the creation of sustainable peace. Each nation and nation-state has their unique histories and grievances; therefore, it is important not to attempt to directly implement the Djibouti peace process to other peace-seeking states and nations, but rather encourage peacebuilding in a similar process that focuses on domestic solutions.

The Horn of Africa has witnessed periods of peace through multi-layered attempts to make peace, but the next step for leaders in the region is to build sustainable peace within the region. Regional economic integration is a slow but sustainable process with potential to heal grievances and economically revitalize the Horn of Africa. From a realist perspective, the conflicts in this region arise from geopolitical issues and the nature of the societies living in the region; however, this essay has attempted to break down this realist perspective and create an understanding of the constructivist nature of

²³ Vasu Gounden, Venashri Pillay, and Mbuga Karanja, "African Solutions for African Conflicts: Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Africa," in *Shaping a New Africa*, ed. Abdullah A. Mohamoud (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: KIT Publishers, 2007) p. 44

the African Horn's civil wars and inter-state conflicts. In the same way that societies and nations can manufacture and ingrain grievances, they can work together to mend the relationships.

Regional economic integration provides this opportunity as the nations in the Horn of Africa could share labour and capital and make use of the geopolitically advantageous position of the Horn that has plagued the region in the past. Ethiopia and Eritrea have signed agreements that jointly develop Eritrea's ports, giving the landlocked Ethiopia essential access to the Red Sea.²⁴ Furthermore, the presidents of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia held a series of meetings in 2018 to discuss possible ventures for development projects in the cities of Gondar and Bahir Dar and in early 2019, the leaders met to strengthen ties and discuss regional security issues.^{25 26} While the discussions may not have generated lasting peace yet, it is a crucial example of African leaders setting the security agenda for their own region and as the Horn of Africa is a critical region holding geopolitical interests for countries across the globe, collective action could elevate the bargaining powers of the countries in this region. Foreign powers hold interests in the region, but collective action and agenda-setting could amplify the bargaining strength of each African Horn country. In his work, "African Thinkers and the Global Security Agenda", Samuel Makinda argues that African thinkers and leaders must portray their domestic security concerns as global issues. The potential to increase economic and security collaboration in this highly contested region falls directly in line with his suggestions.²⁷

²⁴ Joe Bavier, "Ex-Foes Ethiopia, Eritrea Eye Peace Dividend after Historic Deal," Reuters, July 9, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea-economy-idUSKBN-1JZ2KS>.

²⁵ Daniel Mumbere, "Economic Union Seeking Ethiopia Welcomes Eritrea, Somalia Leaders," Africa News, September 11, 2018, <https://www.africanews.com/2018/11/09/photos-economic-union-seeking-ethiopia-welcomes-eritrea-somalia-leaders/>.

²⁶ Mehari Taddele Maru, "Is Political Integration in the Horn of Africa Possible?," Al Jazeera, April 6, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/political-integration-horn-africa-190321132102306.html>.

²⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, "African Thinkers and the Global

Europe's evolution from a war-torn continent to a heavily integrated collective of nations provides a compelling case to why regional integration might be the key to create sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa. Countries like Germany and France held grievances towards one another built up over centuries of conflict and hatred, but since the Second World War and the restructuring of their governments, cooperation has allowed for both countries to prosper despite the devastation caused to both societies. People across Europe from differing cultures and languages began to work together, to live together, and to share their experiences, slowly merging into a common European identity. While the countries in the Horn of Africa also hold significant grievances, the recognition of mutual benefit from economic cooperation could potentially push the respective governments to work closely with each other and create a new Horn of Africa identity.

Each nation and nation-state has their unique histories and grievances; therefore, it is important not to attempt to directly implement the Djibouti peace process to other peace-seeking states and nations, but rather encourage peacebuilding in a similar process that focuses on domestic solutions.

Regional cooperation initiatives are not in Africa: the East African Community is currently making strong progress, establishing a customs union and common goods market, and working towards a common currency by 2023.²⁸ A potentially successful regional integration initiative in the Great Lakes region in Africa could also provide further incentive to the Horn of Africa leaders to cooperate, in a sense of urgency to not miss out from economic prosperity through

²⁸ EAC, "Pillars of EAC Regional Integration," East African Community, 2020, <https://www.eac.int/integration-pillars>.

joint economic actions. Overall, sustainable peace is an idea which locals must build themselves with the collaboration and cooperation of all of those who hold grievances, and the potential to prosper could incentivise economic integration, which would in turn increase interdependence and culture sharing in the Horn of Africa. Italian colonial administration and its negative consequences helped shape and create a new Eritrean national identity out of a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual group; likewise, economic integration and cooperation, along with shared legal practices, can create a new African Horn identity which could promote sustainable peace.

In conclusion, foreign intervention has played a crucial role in the creation and furtherment of grievances in the Horn of Africa, leading to secessionist movements, civil wars, and inter-state conflicts. Colonial partitioning with no regard to groups living in the region and oppressive policies pushed forward by colonial administrations precipitated grievances in the Horn of Africa. Somalia was split into five regions and is still struggling with a fragmented society and state. Oppressive Italian rule led to the creation of an Eritrean national identity and British negligence towards this identity led to countless conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The French colonial administration's ethnically divisive policies between the Afars and Issas in Djibouti led to entrenched grievances between the two. Colonial superpowers created the situation, but Cold War superpowers capitalized on existing grievances and further prolonged the conflicts, as seen with the United States and the Soviet Union's impact in Somalia's domestic and inter-state conflicts, as well as Eritrea's secession struggle against Ethiopia. Insufficient peacemaking attempts not only failed to establish lasting peace, but also aggravated and rekindled conflict in the Horn of Africa. Some of these failures stemmed from domestic reasons like the attitudes of some clan leaders towards the peacemaking process in Somalia, but foreign tampering and interests were the greatest

factors in preventing the establishment of sustainable peace. Djibouti is an important example of solving grievances through local peace talks and communication, but both sides of the grievance must be ready to reach a compromise. The United States and France played a role in Djibouti's peace process, but overall, the peace was implemented and adopted to fit local needs, making it sustainable. Regional economic integration is a key step towards sustainable peace, as sharing capital and labour spurs integration of societies, sharing of culture, and hopefully mending of past the grievances. Creating grievances is achieved easily, but mending them is especially difficult, and while this process will take time, the only way to move forward is to increase communication and reach mutual understanding.

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